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CR!MINALIZA TION OF AIR DISASTERS
"[T] he risk that the threat of criminal prosecution places on
the future safety of air travel greatly outweighs any societal
benefit in satisfying the inherent human desire for revenge or
punishment in the wake of a terrible loss."'
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE WORLDWIDE TREND of increased criminalization of
aviation disasters warrants a critical assessment of what is
achieved by this approach. More than ever before, everyone
from maintenance personnel to pilots to air traffic controllers to
airline executives may be prosecuted for acts of mere negligence
that contributed to a crash. Where aviation accidents are more
often than not caused by mistake and misfortune, not malice,
and administrative and civil remedies are nearly always available,
what is gained by prioritizing retribution over investigation?
Criminal investigations concerned with apportioning fault
and exacting punishment are often at cross-purposes with tech-
nical investigations, which are solely aimed at discovering an ac-
cident's cause so as to prevent recurrence. Judicial and safety
investigators may simultaneously vie for access to the same criti-
cal evidence, while witnesses, participants, and corporate repre-
sentatives who possess key information may turn reticent in the
face of a perceived threat of criminal prosecution. There is
widespread concern in the aviation industry that prioritizing the
needs of the public and the victims' families to avenge the tragic
consequences of an air disaster may impede aviation safety by
creating a chilling effect on those with the most critical insight
into the circumstances of a crash scenario. If the primary aim is
to prevent future accidents, criminalization could prove more of
a hindrance than a help.
While Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention on International
Civil Aviation (Annex 13) mandates that states conduct an inde-
pendent safety investigation with the sole objective of prevent-
ing future accidents,2 the potential interference of judicial
authorities in the post-crash environment is on the rise-in
some countries more than others. This article offers a critical
analysis of the prospects for the success of the "non-punitive"
I Kenneth P. Quinn, Battling Accident Criminalization, AEROSAFETY WORLD, Jan.
2007, at 12.
2 Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Annex 13 to the Convention on International
Civil Aviation: Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, at 3-1 (9th ed. 2001)
[hereinafter Annex 13], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/10862579/Icao-
Annex-13-9th-edition.
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model of safety investigations in the context of the ever-increas-
ing criminal prosecution of aviation disasters.
We will explore the climate domestically, where although the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) enjoys primary
authority over air crash investigations and implements a rigor-
ous standard for bringing criminal charges, prosecutions, such
as those in the SabreTech case, still occur. We will contrast this
with the French system in which a criminal investigation is auto-
matically launched following an aviation disaster and the judi-
cial authority enjoys greater control over site exploration and
access to key evidence. Further, we will address the trend to-
ward increased criminal prosecutions worldwide through an ex-
amination of the 2001 Linate and Crossair disasters and the
troubling consequences they have for both aviation safety and
the industry as a whole. We will explore possible solutions for
reining in aggressive judicial authorities and protecting the criti-
cal free flow of safety information in the aviation community
through post-accident safety investigations as well as proactive
voluntary incident reporting.
Ultimately, the typical goals of the criminal justice system-
retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence-may not be fur-
thered in the aviation accident context, and the promotion of
aviation safety may not be well served by criminal prosecution.
II. THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE INCREASE IN
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
It is not clear exactly why criminal prosecutions following avia-
tion disasters have been on the rise. Some speculate that the
public's increased desire for corporate accountability in every
industry fueled this trend.' Others attribute it, in part, to rapid
technological advancements, such as computer animation of
flight paths and the expansive data that can be captured by de-
vices such as the digital flight data recorder (DFDR) that enable
investigators to identify both organizational and accident-spe-
cific failures with greater certainty.4 Whatever the reason, the
3 SOFIA MICHAELIDES-MATEOU & ANDREAS MATEOU, FLYING IN THE FACE OF
CRIMINALIZATION: THE SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF PROSECUTING AVIATION PROFES-
SIONALS FOR ACCIDENTS 3 (2010); Linda Werfelman, Delerring Criminalization, AER-
oSAFETY WORLD, Mar. 2008, at 17.
4 MICHAELIDES-MATEOU & MATEOU, supra note 3.
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past decade or two has undeniably seen greater involvement of
judicial authorities in the aftermath of aviation disasters.5
III. THE REALITY (AND UNCERTAINTY) OF PARALLEL
INVESTIGATIONS
In the wake of an aviation accident, two parallel investigations
often ensue: (1) the technical, or safety, investigation and (2)
the legal investigation.6 The purpose of the former is to identify
the circumstances and causal factors that produced the accident
in an effort to improve aviation safety, whereas the latter is
aimed at providing compensation to the victims' families or as-
signing blame and punishment to those at fault.7 Safety investi-
gations are typically conducted according to the international
standards established by Annex 13, which prescribes a non-puni-
tive format.8 Nevertheless, great variation exists across coun-
tries' execution of both their technical and judicial
investigations and the interplay between them, resulting in some
degree of unpredictability with regard to the potential conse-
quences and exposure following a crash scenario. This uncer-
tainty alone prompts key witnesses in an investigation to adopt a
more guarded stance, which, in turn, impedes the discovery of
critical information that could improve safety. By way of exam-
ple, following an examination of the international framework
set forth in Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention and the stan-
dards adopted by the European Community, this article prima-
rily focuses on the differences between the investigative
approaches of the United States and France.
A. THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK: ICAO ANNEX 13
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
promulgates standards and recommended practices to be fol-
lowed by the global aviation community.' Annex 13 sets forth
the international requirements for the investigation of aircraft
5 See Richard M. Dunn, David Hazouri & Julie Rannik, Criminalization of Negli-
gent Acts by Employees of U.S. and Foreign Corporations, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 17, 17
(2002); Quinn, supra note 1, at 11.
6 MICHAELIDES-MATEOU & MATEOU, supra note 3, at 2.
7 Id.
Id.; see also infra Part III.A.
9 ICAO, Convention on International Civil Aviation, at 16-17, ICAO Doc. 7300/9
(9th ed. 2006), available at http://www.icao.int/icaonet/arch/doc/7300/7300_9
ed.pdf.
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accidents and incidents.'0 Annex 13 establishes practical guide-
lines for conducting accident investigations; for example, it
prescribes who shall be responsible for controlling the investiga-
tion and maintaining the custody of the aircraft and relevant
evidence." By default, the State of Occurrence shall institute,
and be responsible for, an investigation into the crash's circum-
stances unless this responsibility is otherwise delegated by mu-
tual consent.12 ICAO standards emphasize that the "sole
objective" of any such investigation "shall be the prevention of
accidents and incidents . . . not . . . to apportion blame or
liability."''|
To prioritize the preventative, safety-focused analysis, Annex
13 assigns unrestricted authority over the investigation to the
safety investigation agency, giving the investigator-in-charge un-
hampered access to the wreckage and other relevant material. 4
Moreover, the State of Occurrence is responsible for "pro-
tect[ing] the evidence and.., maintain ling] . .. custody of the
aircraft and its contents." 5 Under Annex 13, certain sensitive
records and communications receive protection from disclo-
sure, such as statements taken from persons by the investigation
authorities, all communications between the aircraft's operators,
and cockpit voice recordings.' 6 Otherwise, this information, in-
cluding information voluntarily communicated by those inter-
viewed during the course of the investigation, "could be utilized
inappropriately for subsequent disciplinary, civil, administrative
and criminal proceedings."' 7 ICAO cautions that "[i]f such in-
formation is distributed, it may, in the future, no longer be
openly disclosed to investigators. Lack of access to such infor-
mation would impede the investigation process and seriously af-
fect flight safety." '
Nevertheless, variation in the implementation and execution
of safety investigations exists among countries. Indeed, pursu-
ant to Article 38 of the Convention, each party is required to file
"0 Annex 13, supra note 2, at 5-1.
I1 Id. at 3-1, 5-2.
2 Id. at 5-1.
13 Id. at 3-1.
14 Id. at 5-2. Annex 13 defines the "investigator-in-charge" as "[a] person
charged, on the basis of his or her qualifications, with the responsibility for the
organization, conduct and control of an investigation." Id. at 1-1.
15 Id. at 3-1.
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a "Difference" contained in a Supplement to Annex 13 if its na-
tional regulations diverge from the practices set forth in Annex
13.19
The United States, for example, adopts a much more restric-
tive policy regarding public access to cockpit voice recordings
and transcripts. 21 "The NTSB has initial control over the cock-
pit voice recorder [(CVR)] and flight data recorder and is pre-
cluded from publicly disclosing any part of the [CVR] if it is
relevant to the accident. 21  However, there are provisions al-
lowing for the discovery of these protected materials in ajudicial
proceeding if they are required for a fair trial.22 Indeed,
"United States Courts can order the disclosure of [this] . . .in-
formation for other than accident investigation purposes," with-
out consideration of the adverse effects on future
investigations. 23 If these items are disclosed in discovery, how-
ever, the court is required to prevent their public release.24
France, on the other hand, does not grant total control over
the accident wreckage to the lead safety investigator and gives
the judicial authority discretion over relevant documents. 25
19 ICAO, Differences Incorporated by ICAO in Supplements to Annexes Further to a
Safety Oversight Audit 2 (Council, Working Paper No. C-WP/11302, 2000) ("Arti-
cle 38 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 1944) provides,
inter alia, that each State is responsible for notifying ICAO promptly of any differ-
ences between its own regulations or practices and an international Standard,
when it finds it impracticable to comply in all respects with any such international
Standard.").
20 See 49 U.S.C. § 1114(c) (2006); ICAO, Supplement to Annex 13-Aircraft Acci-
dent and Incident Investigation, at United States 1 (9th ed. 2003) [hereinafter ICAO
Supplement]. Notably, however, "U.S. law provide [s] significantly more public ac-
cess to most investigation records than is provided in [ICAO] Annex 13." ICAO
Supplement, supra. But deliberations related to analysis, findings, probable causes
and safety recommendations are restricted to the investigative authority and its
staff, and these "solely NTSB internal activities" result in "'For Official Use Only'
work products" shielded from production under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA). Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000); 49 C.F.R. § 801.54 (2002); 49 C.F.R.
§ 831.14 (2002)).
21 NTSB Bar Ass'n, Aviation Professionals and the Threat of Criminal Liability-
How Do We Maximize Aviation Safety?, 67J. AIR L. & COM. 875, 904 (2002) (citing
49 U.S.C. § 1114(c) (2000)).
22 Id. at 905 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (2000)).
23 ICAO Supplement, supra note 20.
24 49 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (2006); ICAO Supplement, supra note 20.
25 ICAO Supplement, supra note 20, at France 1.
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B. THE EUROPEAN APPROACH: EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVES
All member states of the European Union (EU) are parties to
the Chicago Convention and are therefore obligated to investi-
gate civil aviation accidents. 26 The EU promulgated its own di-
rectives to implement the standards set forth in Annex 13 and to
provide guidance to member states on how to achieve "coopera-
tion and mutual assistance" in the context of an aviation
investigation.27
Directive 94/56/EC, the most current iteration of the applica-
ble directive, draws from a number of Annex 13's fundamental
principles in seeking a uniform framework for aviation accident
investigations across the European member states.28 Directive
94/56/EC requires member states to "ensure that every accident
or serious incident in civil aviation is subject to an investigation
by an independent body [whose] only purpose . . .is to prevent
future accidents and not to apportion blame or liability."29 The
Directive also establishes guidelines for the publication of final
reports and the issuance of safety recommendations."
Like Annex 13, the EU recognizes the need for safety investi-
gations separate from those carried out by judicial authorities,
while acknowledging the tensions that arise from these multiple
investigations-particularly, the difficulty of protecting informa-
tion gathered during the course of the investigation.3 1 The Di-
rective preserves investigators' "free access to the accident site,
wreckage," and other relevant evidence, but it does not assign
responsibility to the State of Occurrence for custody and preser-
vation of the accident site or evidence gathered in the investiga-
tion (including witness statements) and does not provide the
same protection from disclosure set forth in Annex 13 for draft
26 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of
the European Parliament and of the Council on Investigation and Prevention of Accidents
and Incidents in Civil Aviation-Impact Assessment § 2.3.1 (Comm'n of the European
Cmtys., Working Document No. SEC (2009) 1477, 2009) [hereinafter EC Staff
Working Document].
27 Id.
28 Id. § 2.3.1 & tbl.I. The EU also promulgated Directive 2003/42/EC to ad-
dress occurrence reporting in civil aviation, establishing a safety reporting system
that protects the confidentiality of the reporting party. Id. § 2.3.2; see also discus-
sion infra Part VI.B.2.
29 EC Staff Working Document, supra note 26, § 2.3.1.
30 Id. at tbl.I.
31 Id. § 3.3.
414
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reports and sensitive safety information.32 While some member
states have developed legislation aimed to protect sensitive
safety information, their protections may not "transfer" to inves-
tigations taking place in, or involving, other member states.
Also, like Annex 13, the EU directives are only as effective as
their implementation by each respective member state, necessa-
rily resulting in variation and uncertainty among different
countries.34
C. THE UNITED STATES APPROACH: NTSB GRANTED
PRIMARY AUTHORITY
1. NTSB's Primary Jurisdiction
In the United States, Congress delegated the investigation of
aviation accidents mandated under ICAO Annex 13 to the
NTSB.35 The NTSB is charged with reporting "the facts, circum-
stances, and cause or probable cause of' these accidents. 36 In
1974, "[t]he NTSB... was affirmed as 'an independent Govern-
ment agency, located within the Department of Transportation,
to promote transportation safety by conducting independent ac-
cident investigations and by formulating safety improvement
recommendations.' v3 7 In this capacity, "[t]he NTSB investigates
all public aircraft accidents in the United States and participates
in the investigation of accidents abroad where the United States
is the State of registry, operator, designer, or manufacture."3 "
There are features built in to the NTSB's structure to ensure
its independence; the "Board" itself is comprised of five individ-
uals appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of
the Senate, to serve five-year terms. 9 No more than three of
32 Id. at tbl.I; see also Annex 13, supra note 2, at 5-3 (regarding non-disclosure of
records).
33 EC Staff Working Document, supra note 26, § 3.3 & n.50 (citing the UK as
an example of a State that adopted a memorandum of understanding to ensure
the simultaneous independence of, and cooperation among, the Crown Prosecu-
tion Service (CPS), the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB), the Marine
Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), and the Rail Accident Investigation
Branch (RAIB)).
34 Id. § 3.3.
35 49 U.S.C. § 1131(a)(1) (2006).
36 Id.; see also NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 894.
37 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Independence of Aviation Safety Investigation Authorities:
Keeping the Foxes from the Henhouse, 75J. AIR L. & COM. 223, 265 (2010) (citing 49
U.S.C. § 1901(1) (2006)).
38 Id. at 267.
39 Id.
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these five may be members of the same political party, and at
least three members must be appointed on the basis of their
40technical qualifications.
An NTSB investigation "consist[s] of four phases: (1) launch;
(2) fact-finding; (3) analysis; and (4) report production. 41 The
investigator-in-charge (a senior investigator who serves as team
leader) appoints groups of specialists (or "parties" to the investi-
gation) in relevant areas of expertise-such as operations, air
navigation services, maintenance, weather, and human perform-
ance-to develop the investigative record.42 While these parties
may include aircraft operators and manufacturers, and always
include Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) representatives,
individuals who hold legal or litigation positions are never
involved.
Although the NTSB is designed to be independent from the
litigation process, the practical reality is often more compli-
cated. 44 Despite the fact that NTSB reports cannot be intro-
duced into evidence, and U.S. law also precludes testimony from
an NTSB investigator in court, litigators involved in suits arising
out of the investigated crashes often rely heavily upon such re-
ports to assess liability, and indeed, trial may be postponed
pending the issuance of the NTSB Final Report.45 The NTSB
has established regulations aimed at differentiating between
(admissible) factual findings about an accident and the (inad-
40 Id. at 267-68 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2006)). The Board is "supported
by a staff of several hundred." Id. at 267.
41 Id. at 268 (citing U.S. GOVT. AccoUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-118, NA-
TIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD: PROGRESS MADE, YET MANAGEMENT PRAC-
TICES, INVESTIGATION PRIORITIES, AND TRAINING CENTER USE SHOULD BE IMPROVED
12 (2006)).
42 Jim Hall, Chairman, Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Remarks at the 6th Annual
Aviation Litigation Seminar (June 1, 2000) [hereinafter Hall Remarks], available
at http://www.ntsb.gov/speeches/former/hall/jhcO060l.htm.
43 Dempsey, supra note 37, at 268 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 831.11(a) (2005)). As
then-Chairman of the NTSB, Jim Hall, stated, NTSB investigations "are not con-
ducted to determine the rights or liabilities of any person-rather they are con-
ducted to ensure the safety of our transportation system and the American
people who use it." Hall Remarks, supra note 42.
- Dempsey, supra note 37, at 270.
45 Id. at 270-71 (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 1441 (e), 1903(c) (2006)); see also 49 U.S.C.
§ 1154(b) (2006) ("No part of a report of the Board, related to an accident or an
investigation of an accident, may be admitted into evidence or used in a civil
action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report.").
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missible) Board accident reports, which include the finding of
probable cause.46
2. Federal Aviation Administration Involvement
In the United States, the NTSB is not typically the only agency
involved in post-accident investigative efforts. As the FAA has
'jurisdiction over aviation professionals, other than military pi-
lots," it too may conduct aircraft accident investigations, "partici-
pate[ ] in the NTSB's investigation or, by delegation, conduct[]
the fact-finding for the [NTSB].'7 Although the NTSB retains
"the responsibility to make regulatory recommendations to the
FAA to avoid future accidents," the FAA has actual authority to
promulgate and enforce regulations that apply to "airlines, air-
men, manufacturers, and airports."4 The FAA, which is led by
"an Administrator, who is appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate," is responsible for considering
and responding to the NTSB's recommendations, and is "re-
quired to consider the maintenance and enhancement of safety
and security as among [its] highest priorities."49
3. "Secondary" Role of Criminal Authorities
While the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) may also con-
duct its own investigation, Congress clarified that the FBI may
only assume "primary authority" over the investigation in limited
circumstances-where the "Attorney General, in consultation
with the [NTSB Chairman], determines . . . that circumstances
reasonably indicate that the accident may have been caused by
an intentional criminal act."5 Otherwise, the NTSB retains au-
thority over other government departments in the investigation
of civil or public aircraft accidents, and an investigation by the
Board "has priority over any investigation by another depart-
46 Dempsey, supra note 37, at 271 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 835 (2005)). U.S. courts
followed suit, with the U.S. Supreme Court and federal district courts attempting
to clarify the distinction between "factual findings" and "conclusions"; the former
is held admissible, while the latter is not. See, e.g., Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,
488 U.S. 153 (1988); In reAir Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, on July 19, 1989,
780 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
47 NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 894-95.
48 Dempsey, supra note 37, at 261-62.
49 Id. at 264 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d) (2006)).
50 49 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2) (B) (2006); NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 895-96
(citing National Transportation Safety Board Amendments Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-424, 114 Stat. 1883).
4172011]
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ment, agency, or instrumentality of the United States
Government."
51
4. Threat of Rise of Criminal Prosecutions
The recent rise of criminal prosecutions in the aviation con-
text threatens the NTSB's investigative efficiency. 52 Indeed, in
some investigations, "court orders . . . have prevent[ed] the
NTSB from testing critical components," and with increased liti-
gation, Board investigators have been unable to interview trans-
portation operators.5 Delays resulting from prosecutorial
activities have "restrained the Board's capability to make timely
determinations of probable cause and issue safety recommenda-
tions."54 Importantly, the FAA acknowledged that fear of these
criminal prosecutions may hamper the free flow of safety infor-
mation critical to the NTSB's evaluation and analysis of an acci-
dent's causes and its recommendations for their avoidance in
the future.55
As the NTSB observed:
The reticence of witnesses to disclose information may result in
error reporting by those individuals who provide testimony and
may ultimately impede an investigation. Approximately seventy-
51 49 U.S.C. § 1131 (a) (2) (A).
52 See NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 895-96.
53 Id. at 879-80.
54 Id. at 880.
55 Id. at 880-81. Former NTSB Chairman, Jim Hall, reflected on one such
instance during an October 1999 House of Representatives subcommittee hear-
ing involving the NTSB's inability to effectively carry out its investigative function
following a pipeline disaster:
My investigators have been stymied by the prospect of criminal
prosecutions . . . and a number of our investigative activities have
been suspended because most of the central players will not talk to
us. And, prosecutors have asked that we not test the valve of the
pipeline until their concerns regarding evidence preservation can
be allayed .... [F]or now, we simply do not know all we need to
know about the pipeline's operations and its level of safety.
Richard M. Dunn, Sherril M. Colombo & Allison E. Nold, Criminalization in Avia-
tion: Are Prosecutorial Investigations Relegating Aviation Safety to the Back Seat?, 38
BRIEF 10, 18 (2009) (citing Hearing on the Bellingham, Washington, Hazardous Liquid
Pipeline Incident Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Dev., Pub. Bldgs., Hazardous Materials,
and Pipeline Transp. of the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure 106th Cong. 102
(1999) (statement of Jim Hall, Chairman, Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd.)). During his
subsequent remarks at the 2000 Annual Aviation Litigation Seminar, then-Chair-
man Hall noted: "The [pipeline] matter has been resolved, but too much lawyer-
ing went on before we were able to test the physical evidence of that tragedy."
Hall Remarks, supra note 42.
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five per cent of aircraft accidents in the United States involve
some form of human error. Thus, the potential for losing the
cooperation of individuals who feel they may face criminal accu-
sations is very real.56
Indeed, despite the United States' prioritization of the non-
punitive safety investigation model executed by the NTSB, wit-
nesses have reason to be wary. Under U.S. law, if the FAA is
involved in the investigation efforts, "the [Federal Aviation Reg-
ulations (FARs)] direct FAA employees to report any suspected
violation of a criminal provision of the Federal Aviation Act...
to the FAA's legal department," which, if appropriate, may then
forward the information to the Department of Justice for crimi-
nal prosecution.57
While criminal prosecutions following aviation disasters may
be less common in the United States than elsewhere, troubling
examples, such as the SabreTech prosecution, still exist.
5. The SabreTech Prosecution
The NTSB characterized the state and federal prosecutions of
SabreTech, Inc. (SabreTech) and three of its employees as "the
first full-scale criminal investigation into the facts and circum-
stances underlying a major U.S. aviation disaster. 58
On May 11, 1996, ValuJet Flight 592 crashed into the Florida
Everglades after departing from Miami International Airport,
killing all 110 passengers and crew onboard. 59  Following
prompt investigation of the accident by the NTSB and FAA, it
became apparent that the accident was likely caused by "a fire in
the cargo hold fueled by oxygen generators that were [improp-
erly] placed aboard the aircraft as COMAT (Company Owned
Materials). '"6' The NTSB determined that the generators ig-
nited shortly after takeoff, causing the crash. 61
56 NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 904.
57 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 13.23(b) (2002)).
58 Id. at 883. Indeed, SabreTech was the first U.S. aviation company to be
criminally prosecuted following an American airline crash. Ken Kaye & Robin
Benedick, Judge Puts an End to Valujet Saga, SUNSENTINEL.COM (Aug. 28, 2002),
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2002-08-28/news/0208280106_1_sabretech-avi-
ation-safety-valujet [hereinafter End to Saga].
59 NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 898.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 883. "Today, ... all airliner cargo compartments must have fire sup-
pression and smoke detection equipment." End to Saga, supra note 58.
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"SabreTech was Valujet's maintenance contractor, whose em-
ployees" were accused of improperly packaging and labeling the
expired chemical oxygen generators before shipping them to
ValuJet.6 2 In brief, "SabreTech mechanics had signed [off on]
inaccurate work cards indicating that safety caps had been in-
stalled on [the] oxygen generators," which had been removed
from three Valujet MD-80s, when in fact they had not.63 The
mechanics properly tagged the generators as unserviceable and
"out of date" and took them to the Valujet hold area of the
SabreTech facility, where they believed the generators would be
discarded.64 Without the mechanics' knowledge, "the genera-
tors were later returned to the Valujet ramp area [for loading
onto the aircraft] by a shipping and receiving clerk who mistak-
enly believed that the generators were empty.
6 1
a. Involvement of Criminal Authorities
Early on, the NTSB and FAA were competing alongside crimi-
nal investigators for access to relevant evidence.6 6 The FBI exe-
cuted a search warrant at SabreTech's Miami facility, served
grand jury subpoenas on SabreTech and Valujet, and FBI and
local law enforcement agents even made nighttime visits to com-
pany employees at their homes, seeking interviews.67
In 1997, SabreTech and three of its employees were federally
charged "in a 24-count indictment for conspir[acy] to falsify air-
craft records, falsifying aircraft records, violating hazardous
materials regulations, and placing a destructive device on board
an aircraft. '68 By criminally charging SabreTech, the govern-
62 NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 883.
63 Id. at 890-91.
64 Id. at 890-91, 899.
65 Id. at 891.
66 Id. at 899.
67 Id. at 899-900. In addition to the U.S. federal charges, in 1999, the Miami-
Dade State Attorney brought murder, manslaughter, and environmental crime
charges against SabreTech. Ina Paiva Cordle, Valujet Crash: Case Closed, MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 8, 2001, at 1C. Pursuant to a 2001 plea bargain, SabreTech pled no
contest to one count of unlawful transport of hazardous waste, and its parent
company, Sabreliner, paid $500,000. Id. The 110 counts of murder and 110
counts of manslaughter were dropped. Id.
68 Dunn, Hazouri & Rannik, supra note 5, at 19; see also Dunn, Colombo &
Nold, supra note 55, at 15. Notably, several of the counts involving the allegedly
falsified maintenance paperwork were unrelated to the crash at issue, signaling
the broad exposure a company may face once subject to criminal inquiry. Dunn,
Hazouri & Rannik, supra note 5, at 19.
420
CRIMINALIZA TION OF AIR DISASTERS
ment characterized its employees' actions as willful69 While the
jury acquitted the employees of all charges against them individ-
ually, and SabreTech itself of some of the more serious offenses
(such as conspiracy and knowingly and willfully making false
statements on maintenance records), it found the company
guilty of recklessly causing the transportation of hazardous
materials in air commerce and improper training."0 The Elev-
enth Circuit ultimately vacated the recklessness convictions
against the company, noting, inter alia, that "'[t] he record re-
flects that these aviation repair station personnel committed
mistakes, but they did not commit crimes,"' and moreover, they
"'did not intend to kill'" the accident victims. 71
Despite the jury's acquittals and the appellate court's rever-
sals, the charging decision alone is a sobering indication of the
potential for such prosecutions-whereby criminal intent is at-
tributed to mere negligence-even in the United States.72
D. THE FRENCH APPROACH: INCREASED JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT
While France's accident investigation framework may initially
appear comparable to that of the United States, its activistjudici-
ary creates a markedly different dynamic.
69 NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 891.
70 Dunn, Colombo & Nold, supra note 55, at 15. ValuJet, while never crimi-
nally charged, was grounded by the FAA in June 1996, and never fully recovered
from the reputational damage following the crash. Valufet Grounded, CNN.coM
(June 17, 1996), http://www.cnn.com/us/9606/17/valujet.grounded/in-
dex.html; With Valujet in Past, AirTran Soars as Others Struggle, USA TODAY (Aug.
18, 2003), http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/features/2003/2003-08-18-air-
tran.htm [hereinafter Valujet in Past]. It merged with AirTran Airways one year
later. ValuJet in Past, supra.
71 United States v. SabreTech, Inc., 271 F.3d 1018, 1019, 1025 (11th Cir. 2001).
The appellate court also concluded that applicable federal law did not recognize
a valid cause of action for the reckless handling of hazardous materials. See id. at
1020, 1022-24.
72 See David Esler, Flight Risk: The Threat of Criminalization, AVIATION WEEK (Mar.
10, 2009), http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story-generic.jsp?chan-
nel=bca&id=news/bca03O9pl.xml (quoting aviation attorney, Eileen Gleimer of
Crowell & Moring LLP, as observing that "'[a] lthough Title 49 of the U.S. Code
provides for criminal penalties for certain acts relating to aviation ... they gener-
ally involve willful and intentional violations"'). Gleimer goes on to note that
"defining and proving that an action rises to the level of a criminal act is not an
easy task in most instances," which may explain the limited number of criminal
prosecutions in aviation cases in the United States. Id.
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1. The BEA
Like the NTSB, "[t] he Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses pour
la s~curit6 de l'aviation civile (BEA) was established in 1946 to
investigate" aircraft accidents and to prepare reports regarding
their causes.73 The BEA is independent, by statute, from any
other authority and conducts technical investigations not to es-
tablish guilt, but to gather information likely to prevent future
accidents. 4 Indeed, in the "Foreword" of a BEA report, it is
noted that in accordance with Annex 13, EC Directive 94/56,
and the French Civil Aviation Code, "the analysis of the accident
and the conclusions and safety recommendations contained in
this report are intended neither to apportion blame, nor to as-
sess individual or collective responsibility. The sole objective is
to draw lessons from this occurrence which may help to prevent
future accidents or incidents. 7 5
2. Significant Judicial Involvement
Nevertheless, criminal proceedings commonly follow BEA in-
vestigations. Indeed, whereas it is "extremely rare" for a U.S.
76flightcrew to face criminal charges, in France, it is routine for
prosecutors to immediately launch a criminal investigation fol-
lowing an aviation disaster, and ultimately to file charges for in-
voluntary manslaughter against any aviation professional-from
pilots to maintenance mechanics to chief executives of aviation
regulatory authorities-involved in the accident. 77
73 Dempsey, supra note 37, at 253.
74 Id. (citing Loi 99-243 du 29 mars 1999 [Law 99-243 of March 29, 1999],
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RI9PUBLIQUE FRANcAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Mar. 29, 1999, art. L711-2).
75 BUREAU D'ENQIUTES ET D'ANALYSES POUR LA SRCURITt DE L'AVIATION CIVILE
[BEA], Rapport f-sc000725, ACCIDENT SURVENU LE 25 JUILLET 2000 AU LIEU-DIT LA
PATTE D'OIE DE GONESSE (95) AU CONCORDE IMMATRICULP F-BTSC EXPLOITE PAR
AIR FRANCE [Accident on July 25, 2000, at La Patte d'Oie in Gonesse (95) to the
Concorde Registered F-BTSC operated by Air France] 2 (2000), available at
www. bea. aero/docspa/2OOO/f-scO00725/pdf/f-sc00725.pdf
76 Evan P. Singer, Recent Developments in Aviation Safety: Proposals to Reduce the
Fatal Accident Rate and the Debate over Data Protection, 67J. AIR L. & CoM. 499, 519
(2002) ("[T]he criminal prosecution of pilots remains extremely rare in the
United States.").
77 See discussion infra at Part III.D.3.a; CODE DE L'AVIATION CIVILE art. R.142-4
(Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessionid=
16E7666C2C7C57F694EA1A342AC 1 C274.tpdjo 15v_2?idArticle=LEGIARTIOOOO
06844567&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006074234&dateTexte=20110321 ("If the ac-
cident or incident causes damages to transported persons or goods, the public
prosecutor is to be kept informed.").
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The structure of the French system allows many courtesies to
the investigating judicial authority. For instance, unlike in the
United States, BEA reports are not shielded from admission into
evidence in the judicial context."v As mentioned earlier, France
diverges from Annex 13 in that the investigator-in-charge is not
granted total control over the accident wreckage and all relevant
documents; instead, the latter generally remain under the con-
trol of the judicial authority.79
French law establishes broad jurisdiction to hear cases arising
out of aviation disasters-if even one plaintiff, one defendant,
or a defendant's insurer is a French citizen, the French courts
may have jurisdiction over the entire action, regardless of the
crash locale.8 0 Moreover, French criminal procedure allows any
individual harmed by an offense to file a complaint asking a
criminal prosecutor to investigate the crash."' While the deci-
sion to launch a criminal investigation lies with the prosecutor,
if no investigation is initiated within three months or if the pros-
ecutor affirmatively declines to prosecute, then the individual
can file a complaint before an investigative judge (plainte avec
constitution de partie civile) -which alone initiates a criminal in-
vestigation into an air crash. 2 In these complaints, victims seek
financial indemnification for damages suffered as a result of the
criminal offense upon a finding of guilt by a French criminal
court.
8 3
French judges also have the authority to appoint an "expert"
to gather evidence, including written documentation, on techni-
cal questions relating to the investigation from any third party-
even those abroad-and issue a report, before a suit is ever
filed.84 Third parties are required to comply with the expert's
requests, provided the information sought is sufficiently spe-
cific.85 In addition, the judge enjoys the assistance of "special
78 Dempsey, supra note 37, at 254 (citing Simon Foreman, Aviation Accidents
and the French Courts, 20 AIR & SPACE LAW. 1, 16 (2005)).
79 ICAO Supplement, supra note 20, at France 1.
80 Dempsey, supra note 37, at 255 (citing CODE CIqL [C. CIv.] art. 14 (Fr.)).
81 CODE DE PROCtDDURE PtNALE [C. PR. PEN.] art. 85 (Fr.).
82 Id. arts. 85, 87. Further, if a criminal investigation has already been initiated
by the criminal prosecutor, the victim can join the pending criminal action as a
plaintiff at any time by filing a plainte avec constitution de partie civile. Id. art. 87.
83 See Dempsey, supra note 37, at 253-56.
84 CODE DE PROCDURE PtNALE [C. PR. PEN.] arts. 156, 158, 166 (Fr.).
85 Id. art. 164.
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aviation police- Gendarmerie des Transports Atriens-who may
take witnesses into custody and search premises. '8 6
One notable example of the aggressive French judiciary at
work was the lengthy criminal investigation and prosecution that
followed the 1992 Air Inter crash.
3. Air Inter Crash (near Strasbourg, France)
On January 20, 1992, an Air Inter Airbus A320 flight from
Lyon to Strasbourg crashed into "the cloud-shrouded Vosges
mountains" while attempting a VOR/DME approach, killing
eighty-seven of the ninety-six people onboard.8" While various
factors contributed to the crash of Flight 148, the BEA con-
cluded that the accident occurred because the pilots inadver-
tently left the autopilot set in the Vertical Speed mode, instead
of the Flight Path Angle mode, when they entered a "3.3" de-
scent angle.88 As a result, the autopilot interpreted this as a
command to descend at the rapid rate of 3,300 feet per
minute. 89
a. Criminal Consequences
Following the crash, several indictments ensued: Airbus's
then-engineering chief, Bernard Ziegler, was indicted over the
design of the A320 cockpit and the aircraft's possibly faulty DME
navigation system. 0 The absence of a ground proximity warn-
ing system in the Airbus prompted indictments against the then-
86 Dempsey, supra note 37, at 255 (citing Foreman, supra note 78, at 15).
87 France Prosecutes Six over 1992 Air Inter Crash, FLIGHT GLOBAL (Mar. 21, 2006),
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2006/03/21/205526/france-prosecutes-
six-over-1992-air-inter-crash.html [hereinafter France Prosecutes Six]; Don Phillips,
Manslaughter Trial of 6 Starts in 1992 Air Crash, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2006), http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/05/02/world/europe/O2iht-trial.html [hereinafter
Manslaughter Trial of 6].
88 France Prosecutes Six, supra note 87; Accident Description, AVIATION SAFETY NET-
woRK, http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19920120-0 (last vis-
ited Sept. 5, 2011).
89 Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses pour la securit6 de l'aviation civile [BEA],
Committee Report on the Inquiry into the January 20, 1992 Accident near Mount Sainte-
Odile (Bas Rhin) of Airbus A 320 Registration Number F-GGED, Operated by Air Inter,
Report No. F-ED920120 (Nov. 26, 1993), available at http://www.bea.aero/doc-
spa/1992/f-ed920120/htm/f-ed920120.html; see also Accident Description, supra
note 88 (providing a summary of the November 26, 1993, BEA Report in
English).
90 France Prosecutes Six, supra note 87; Manslaughter Trial of 6, supra note 87.
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head of DGAC9  technical control and its director general (who
participated in the decision not to require this device in French
aircraft), as well as the chief executive of Air Inter (a predeces-
sor to Air France).92 Finally, the airline operations director at
the time of the accident, Jacques Rantet, faced charges because
both of the A320 pilots had relatively little experience on the fly-
by-wire twinjet.93
On November 7, 2006, a French court cleared all five aviation
officials and one Airbus executive of criminal charges, but
found Airbus and Air France liable for the pain and suffering of
the victims' families, without specifying a damages figure. 4
The aviation industry viewed the Air Inter crash as a reflection
of the concerning trend to criminalize aviation officials in the
wake of an accident. The media reported on the "relief' felt by
those involved in aviation safety upon the French court's No-
vember 2006 verdict acquitting all six criminally charged offi-
cials.95 Indeed, this proceeding was closely monitored by the
aviation community because those on trial faced actual prison
time-unlike in cases in other developed countries in which im-
plicated companies typically pay monetary damages. 96 It was not
until three years later, in 2009, that "France's highest court fi-
nally confirmed the acquittal of all those originally accused of
responsibility" for this 1992 crash-seventeen years earlier.97
During this substantial delay, the Airbus autopilot was modi-
fied so that a Vertical Speed setting would be displayed as a four-
digit number to avoid confusion with the Flight Path Angle
mode. 9s With appropriate safety recommendations already im-
plemented, one must wonder what purpose is served by the
prosecution of those accused decades after the crash.
91 Direction G~n6rale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC) is the French civil aviation
authority.
92 France Prosecutes Six, supra note 87; Manslaughter Trial of 6, supra note 87.
9- France Prosecutes Six, supra note 87.
94 Nicola Clark & Don Phillips, Court Clears 6 of Criminal Charges in Crash of
FrenchJetliner in 1992, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2006), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9F02E5DFE3FF93BA35752C1A9609C8B63.
95 Don Phillips, Free Flow: No Clear Signals in Aviation Verdict, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 8,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/20O6/11/08/business/worldbusiness/O8iht-
transco109.3456590.html [hereinafter Free Flow].
96 See Manslaughter Trial of 6, supra note 87.
97 Angela Doland, French Court to Rule on Concorde Crash, MSNBC.COM (Dec. 5,
2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40517609/ns/world-news-europe/t/
french-court-rule-concorde-crash/.
98 Accident Description, supra note 88; see France Prosecutes Six, supra note 87.
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As one source noted, "'[i]n France, [criminal] prosecutions
can take up to 15 years under the Napoleonic Code, which stip-
ulates that fatal accidents must be investigated to establish
blame. . . . People can face decades of criminal prosecution"'
under the French system.99 Following the acquittals of aviation
officials charged in the Air Inter crash, the New York Times noted
that the aviation industry's "behind-the-scenes assumption had
been that the court would do what French courts almost always
do: find someone guilty of criminal activity when there's a
crash."' ° And in anticipation of the recent Air France Con-
corde verdict, discussed further infra, the press reported that
"[i] n France, unlike in many other countries, plane crashes rou-
tinely lead to trials to assign criminal responsibility. It is com-
mon for cases to drag on for years."' 1 In fact, "[i] t is routine
French practice to bring charges of 'causing unintentional
death' against managers and others with responsibility in a
chain of events leading to fatal accidents. Prison sentences are
very rare but heavy fines can be imposed. 101 2 Indeed, France
has been identified as "one of a handful of countries that rou-
tinely seek criminal indictments in transportation accidents, re-
gardless of whether there is clear evidence of criminal intent or
negligence.' '1 3
While many in the international aviation community were
hopeful that the court's ultimate acquittal of the Air Inter ac-
cused would signal a decline in criminal prosecutions,10 4 the re-
cent Air France Concorde verdict serves as a troubling reminder
that in some countries, prosecution and conviction of compa-
nies and individuals alike in the wake of an aviation disaster re-
main the norm.
99 Esler, supra note 72 (quoting President and CEO of the Flight Safety Foun-
dation, William Voss).
100 Free Flow, supra note 95.
101 Concorde Crash: Continental Airlines Guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter,
MSNBC.COM (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40527031/ns/
travel/ %20Continental%2OAirlines%2OGuilty (last visited May 30, 2011) [herein-
after Continental Airlines Guilty].
102 Charles Bremner, Continental Airlines Faces Manslaughter Charges over Paris
Concorde Crash, TIMES (Fr.) (Mar. 12, 2008), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/
news/world/europe/article3539777.ece.
103 Nicola Clark, Trial Opens in Concorde Disaster, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/201 0/02/02/world/europe/O2concorde.html?ref=
nicolaclark.
104 See Quinn, supra note 1 (expressing hope that the Air Inter acquittals "re-
present[ ] a watershed event, after which prosecutors and judges will exercise
restraint about bringing criminal investigations").
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4. Air France Concorde Crash (Paris, France)
On July 25, 2000, an Air France Concorde, Flight 4590,
crashed into a nearby Paris hotel moments after takeoff from
Charles de Gaulle International Airport, killing all 109 passen-
gers and crew onboard and claiming the lives of an additional
four victims on the ground.11 5
The BEA conducted the official investigation into the crash,
but a parallel investigation by the prosecutors' office also en-
sued.0 6 Early on, investigators from both groups concluded
that a Continental Airlines DC-10 that took off moments earlier
had dropped titanium debris, part of a thrust reverser, onto the
runway, including a titanium strip that gashed the Concorde
tire, causing a piece of rubber to fly into the aircraft's fuel
tank. 107 This ultimately led to a major fuel leak from the com-
promised tank, which ignited, causing the supersonic jet to
erupt into flames. 0 8
a. Criminal Investigation and Charges
Five years after the crash, French prosecutors placed Conti-
nental under investigation for alleged manslaughter and invol-
untary injury, contending that the carrier's use of titanium,
instead of a softer metal, violated FAA regulations.0 9 France's
wide-sweeping prosecutorial charges also reached John Taylor, a
Continental mechanic who allegedly fitted the non-standard ti-
tanium strip, and Stanley Ford, a Continental maintenance
official. 110
The French judicial inquiry also targeted executives from
Concorde-maker Aerospatiale because their investigation re-
vealed that the jet's fuel' tanks lacked sufficient protection from
shock-a weakness the manufacturer apparently had been
105 Doland, supra note 97.
106 Concorde Chief Suspected over Fatal Crash, TIMES ONLINE (Sept. 27, 2005),
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article571903.ece
[hereinafter Concorde Chief Suspected].
107 Doland, supra note 97.
108 Id.
109 Concorde Chief Suspected, supra note 106; Ex-Concorde Head Quizzed on Crash,
BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4285832.stm (last updated
Sept. 27, 2005).
110 Bremner, supra note 102. Continental vigorously fought the charges, con-
tending that the Concorde caught fire well before it reached the metal strip on
the runway. See Continental Denies Responsibility for Crash as Concorde Trial Begins,
DW-WoRLD.DE (GER.) (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/
0,,5197016,00.html [hereinafter Continental Denies Responsibility].
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aware of for decades.111 Henri Perrier, a former head of the
Concorde program, was investigated and charged for involun-
tary manslaughter, accused of having been informed about the
aircraft's faults, including a series of prior tire incidents, but tak-
ing no action. 112 Claude Frantzen, former director of technical
services at DGAC, was similarly charged.'1 3
By the time the criminal trial began in 2010, the victims' fami-
lies had been financially compensated nearly a decade earlier,'14
and the Concorde had long been permanently retired from ser-
vice. 115 Only the criminal trial lingered on. For the anticipated
cost of more than $4.2 million," 6 the complex four-month crim-
inal trial boiled down to a singular purpose: to assign blame." 7
In December 2010, "[a] French court found Continental Air-
lines and one of its mechanics guilty of involuntary manslaugh-
ter" as a result of the devastating Concorde crash over a decade
earlier." 8 After the airline was found liable for "defective main-
tenance," Continental was fined the equivalent of nearly
$300,000 and ordered to pay $1.32 million in damages and in-
terest to Concorde's operator, Air France. 1 9 The court also
ruled that Continental should pay 70% of any compensation
claims to the victims' families.120 Continental mechanic, John
III Concorde Chief Suspected, supra note 106.
112 Ex-Concorde Head Quizzed on Crash, supra note 109.
1I Bremner, supra note 102.
114 Air France reached a $150 million civil settlement with the victims' families
in 2001. Clark, supra note 103. The airline joined the criminal case as a civil
party in an effort to recoup a portion of this financial payout from Continental.
Id.
115 Id.; see also Continental Denies Responsibility, supra note 110 (both Air France
and British Airways retired the aircraft from service in 2003, ending the world's
only supersonic commercial service).
116 Continental Denies Responsibility, supra note 110.
117 Continental Airlines Guilty, supra note 101. The trial involved testimony from
scores of witnesses and experts, 90 volumes of case files, and 534 pieces of evi-
dence. Concorde Crash Manslaughter 7ial Begins in France, BCC NEWS, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8492561.stm (last updated Feb. 2, 2010).
118 Lisa Bryant, Paris Court Finds Continental Responsible for Concorde Crash,
VOANEWS.COM (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.voanews.com/english/news/europe/
Paris-Court-Finds-Continental-Responsible-for-Concorde-Crash-111386879.html.
119 Henry Samuel, Patriotic French Court Rules U.S. Airline Caused Concorde Disas-
ter, CANADA.COM (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.canada.com/news/Patriotic+
French+court+rules+airline+caused+Concorde+disaster/3932987/story.html?id=
3932987.
120 Continental 'Responsible'for Concorde Crash in 2000, BBC NEWS (Dec. 6, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-I1923556. As Air France has already
paid out 100 million euros in compensation to these relatives, it may seek to
recoup some of that money from Continental. Id.
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Taylor, received a fifteen-month suspended prison sentence and
a fine for faulty manufacturing and installation of the titanium
strip believed to be at the root of the crash.1 2 1
Continental appealed the ruling, which one of its lawyers
characterized as "protectionist," serving only French interests,
not justice. 122
5. Air France Right 447 Crash (Atlantic Ocean, en route to Paris,
France from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil)
Most recently, France's tendency to criminally prosecute fol-
lowing a major air disaster is evident in the investigation of the
Air France Flight 447 crash in June 2009. On June 1, 2009, an
Air France Airbus A330, registration number F-GZCP, crashed
into the Atlantic Ocean on a flight from Rio deJaneiro, Brazil to
Paris, France, killing all 228 people onboard. 123 While the black
box flight recorders were finally discovered in May 2011,124 at
the time of this writing, the investigation into the cause of this
accident was ongoing. It appears that approximately four hours
into the flight, the aircraft encountered severe high-altitude
thunderstorms in the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ),
a region known for its turbulent weather patterns.1 25 The flight-
crew, facing inconsistent airspeed indications and the discon-
nection of the automated systems onboard, failed to bring the
aircraft under control.126 The aircraft ultimately stalled at high
altitude and plummeted from the sky at a vertical speed of ap-
proximatcly 10,000 feet per minute. 27
It was likely a confluence of events that brought about this
tragedy, and the cause of the crash is far from confirmed. The
latest reports-including that issued by the BEA-point, in large
121 Id.
122 Samuel, supra note 119. Air France, the Concorde's operator, was govern-
ment-owned at the time. Id. The court also cleared the three French aviation
officials charged in the crash, placing the blame exclusively on the Houston-
based airline. Id.
123 See BEA, Accident to the Airbus A330-203 Flight AF 44 7 on 1stJune 2009: Update
on Investigation, at 1-4 (May 27, 2011), available at http://www.bea.aero/fr/en-
quetes/vol.af.447/point.enquete.af447.27mai2011.en.pdf.
124 See 16 May 2011 Briefing, BEA, http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/
flight.af.447/info16may2011.en.php (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
125 BEA, Interim Report n'3 on the Accident on 1stJune 2009 to the Airbus A330-203,
Registered F-GZCP, Operated by Air France, Flight AF 447 Rio dejaneiro-Paris, at 9-11
(July 29, 2011) [hereinafter Third Interim Report], available at http://
www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/flight.af.447.php.
126 Id. at 7.
127 Id. at 10.
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part, to pilot error in failing to appropriately respond to the air-
craft stall in the final minutes of the flight. 128 The BEA is still
analyzing the accident data and has yet to issue its final report.
Nevertheless, even before the black boxes were discovered, in
March 2011 French Judge Sylvie Zimmerman filed preliminary
manslaughter charges against both Airbus and Air France. 29
"Preliminary charges allow investigating judges to continue their
probe before deciding whether to send the case to trial."'3 ° Top
officials from Airbus considered this a premature decision, while
Air France CEO Pierre-Henri Gourgeon vowed to protest the
charges as "unfounded."'' While formal charges have yet to be
issued, the prompt initiation of the criminal process under-
scores France's willingness to prosecute in the wake of aircraft
disasters, even when evidence as to the cause of the accident is
lacking or preliminary.
IV. BROADER TREND: INTERNATIONAL INCREASE IN
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS
France is not alone. Elsewhere internationally, it has become
far more common for prosecutors to pursue criminal charges
against aviation professionals following a crash-with troubling
consequences for aviation safety.
A. LINATE AIRPORT DISASTER (MILAN, ITALY)
On October 8, 2001, Scandinavian Airlines Flight 686 (a Boe-
ing MD-87 plane, registration SE-DMA) collided on take-off with
a Cessna 525-A (registration D-IEVX), killing all passengers
onboard both aircraft and an additional four people on the
ground. 3 2 The Scandinavian Airlines Systems (SAS) operated
128 Robert Wall &Jens Flottau, Lessons ofAir France 447 Start to Emerge, AVIATION
WEEK (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=
news/awst/2011/08/08/AW_08_08_2011p39-355091 .xml&headline=Les-
sons%200f%2OAir%20France%20447%20Start% 2OTo%2OEmerge&channel=
awst. See generally Third Interim Report, supra note 125.
129 Pierre-Antoine Souchard, Air France Faces Charges over 2009 Crash, ABc NEWS
(Mar. 18, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id--13164386.
130 Air France Faces Charges over 2009 Crash, FoxNEWS.COM (Mar. 18, 2011),
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/03/18/air-france-faces-charges-200-crash.
131 Souchard, supra note 129.
132 Agenzia Nazionale Per La Sicurezza Del Volo [ANSV], Final Report: Accident
Involved Aircraft Boeing MD-87, Registration SE-DMA and CESSNA 525-A, Registration
D-IEVX, Milano Linate Airport, October 8, 2001 at 1, ANSV Doc. N. A/1/04 (Jan. 20,
2004) [hereinafter ANSV Final Report (Linate)].
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MD-87 was bound for Copenhagen, Denmark, while the Cessna
Citation was on a sales demonstration flight to Paris.133 The ac-
cident, which took place when the airport was shrouded in thick
fog, occurred when the Cessna mistakenly taxied along the air-
port's southern route, which intersects the main runway, from
which the SAS MD-87 was given clearance to take off.'3 4 All four
passengers and crew in the Cessna were killed on impact.135
The MD-87, which lost its right engine in the collision, at-
tempted to take off, but the left engine suffered significant
thrust reduction as a result of debris and was unable to sustain
flight.1 36 The pilot's maneuvers to reverse thrust and apply the
brakes were insufficient to halt the momentum of the jet, which
descended and proceeded to crash into a baggage handling
building located just off the runway, bursting into flames. 13 7
Italy's Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza del Volo (ANSV)
investigated the runway collision and concluded that the "imme-
diate cause" was the incursion of the Cessna aircraft on the ac-
tive runway.138 Nevertheless, additional airport deficiencies-
such as the absence of a functioning ground radar system and
insufficient guidance signs along the taxiways, among others-
were noted as other causes, along with qualification issues with
the Citation flightcrew, who were not certified to operate in
such low-visibility conditions. 39
1. Criminal Consequences
In 2004, "[a] Milan court found four aviation officials guilty of
manslaughter and negligence for their" alleged roles in the
2001 disaster at Linate. 140 The airport director, Vincenzo Fusco,
and the air traffic controller on duty at the time, Paolo
133 Charles Alcock, Jail for Four with Role in CJ2/MD-87 Collision, AVIATION INT'L
NEWS (May 2004), http://www.ainonline.com/ain-and-ainalerts/aviation-interna-
tional-news/single-publication-story/browse/0/article/jail-for-four-with-role-in-
cj2md-87-collision-7217/?nocache=1 &txttnews%5Bmode%5D=1.
134 ANSV Final Report (Linate), supra note 132, at 162.
135 Id. at 1.
136 Id. at 8.
137 Accident Description, AVIATION SAFETY NETWORK, http://aviation-safety.net/
database/record.php?id=20011008-0 (last visited Sept. 5, 2011).
138 ANSV Final Report (Linate), supra note 132, at 162; David Learmount, ATC
Body Blasts Linate Verdicts, FLIGHT GLOBAL (Apr. 27, 2004), http://www.flight
global.com/articles/2004/04/27/180802/atc-body-blasts-linate-verdicts.html.
139 ANSV Final Report (Linate), supra note 132, at 162-63.
140 Jason Horowitz, Europe: Italy: Aviation Officials Sentenced in County's Worst
Crash, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004 /O 4 /1 7/world/
world-briefing-eurpe-itay-aviatin-officias-sentenced-cuntry-s-worst-crash.html.
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Zacchetti, were each given eight-year prison sentences, while six-
and-a-half year terms were handed down to Francesco Federico,
who had overall management responsibility for Milan's two air-
ports (Malpensa and Linate), as well as Sandro Gualano, the for-
mer chief executive of Italy's air traffic control agency, ENAV. 14 1
The ruling represents the first time prison sentences were ever
handed down in Italy as a result of an aviation accident. 142 Re-
ports reflected the satisfaction and comfort felt by victims' rela-
tives at news of the convictions. 43
A year later, four more individuals were convicted in connec-
tion with the Linate crash-three ENAV employees and one air-
port official-each receiving prison sentences between three
years and four years and four months.'44 Three others were ac-
quitted in this second verdict-two employees of SEA, the com-
pany that operates Milan airports, and another ENAV official. 145
2. Italy's Independent Safety Investigation
Article 827 of the Italian Navigation Code requires that an
aviation accident investigation be conducted following the re-
quirements of ICAO Annex 13.146 Accordingly, in the "Purpose
of the Technical Investigation" section of its Final Report, ANSV
notes that it "performs its investigations with the only purpose of
accident and serious incidents prevention, excluding any appraisal of
blame or responsibility."'14 7 Further, ANSV reports issued upon
completion of its accident investigation safeguard the privacy of
all individuals involved in the event as well as those who contrib-
141 Alcock, supra note 133; Horowitz, supra note 140.
142 Learmount, supra note 138. Ultimately, in 2006, an Italian appeals court
overturned the convictions of the airport director and the head of Milan's two
airports, but upheld the others. Italian Court Rules on Linate Disaster Convictions,
ALLBUSINESS.COM (July 10, 2006), http://www.allbusiness.com/operations/ship-
ping-air-freight/1184802-1.html [hereinafter Italian Court Rules]. In February
2008, Italy's highest court affirmed the convictions. Dunn, Colombo & Nold,
supra note 55, at 16.
143 Italian Court Rules, supra note 131; Christian Plumb, Court Jails Four over It-
aly's Worst Air Disaster, REUTERS (Apr. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Court Jails Four] (on
file with author).
144 4 Convicted in 2001 Milan Plane Crash, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2005), http://
www.nytimes.com/2005/03/14/world/europe/14iht-italy.html [hereinafter 4
Convicted]. The air traffic control agency was implicated because an inoperative
ground radar system was found to have contributed to the accident. Court Jails
Four, supra note 143.
145 4 Convicted, supra note 144.
146 ANSV Final Report (Linate), supra note 132, at VII.
147 Id.
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uted information to the investigation, proclaiming "[a] nonymity
will be granted to all persons involved in the events.... Reports
and associated Safety recommendations are never intended to apportion
blame or responsibility.""14
3. Consequences of Competing Investigations
Nevertheless, despite ANSV's established non-punitive investi-
gative role, the convergence of multiple investigative bodies as
early as the night of the Linate incident created conflict and
presented challenges with regard to access to critical evidence:
"'We're not even allowed to look at the plane tonight, because
there's a fight between the two Italian' investigating authorities,
a local Milan magistrate and the national Transportation Secur-
ity Agency, an SAS investigator," unable to initiate his investiga-
tive work, commented. 4 ' The safety investigators in charge of
the investigation complained that they were unable to receive
testimonies from the ground and tower controllers, as well as
the tower supervisor, who made themselves unavailable pending
the judicial procedure. 5 ' The original tape of the radio and
telephone communications was not provided, and because the
Magistrate seized certain equipment from the Cessna aircraft for
purposes of the criminal inquiry, the safety investigators' ability
to test the efficiency of such equipment was compromised.'5 1
Indeed, the ANSV's Final Report itself notes that "[c]ertain
information and evidence, not relevant to the dynamics of the
accident or to its causes, have been seized and kept in custody by
the Magistrate conducting the criminal inquiry and could not
be used for this investigation.1152 While the referenced informa-
tion was requested by ANSV, it had not been obtained by the
date of the Final Report's publication.'
B. CROSSAIR CRASH (ZURICH, SWITZERLAND)
While the criminal inquiry into the 2001 crash of Crossair re-
gional jet Flight 3597 did not proceed until after the safety inves-
tigation was concluded, the protracted prosecution had
devastating consequences for the implicated individuals and the
148 Id.
149 Melinda Henneberger, Small Plane Collides with Jet on Milan Runway; 118 Die,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2001, at A3, available at 2001 WLNR 3349874.
150 EC Staff Working Document, supra note 26, § 3.3.1.1 (Case 1).
15, Id.
152 ANSV Final Report (Linate), supra note 132, at VIII.
153 Id.
4332011]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
struggling airline alike-regardless of the eventual acquittal of
all those charged.'54
Crossair, Swissair's designated successor created in an effort
to sustain a viable airline following the demise of Switzerland's
bankrupt national carrier, was already saddled with the blot of a
2000 accident in which ten people died shortly after takeoff, the
baggage of its predecessor's financial woes, employee protests
over layoffs and severance packages, and Switzerland's strug-
gling airline industry generally, which was attempting to regain
passenger confidence following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the
United States. 15
5
Then, on November 24, 2001, the Avro 146 RJ100 regional jet
(registration HB-IXM) crashed into a wooded range of hills dur-
ing final approach to Zurich International Airport.156 The inves-
tigation performed by Switzerland's Federal Bureau of Air
Accident Investigation (AAIB) concluded that this controlled
flight into terrain was primarily caused by, among other factors,
the flightcrew's deliberate descent "below the minimum altitude
• .. without having the necessary prerequisites. 1 57 Twenty-four
of the thirty-three people onboard were killed. 158
154 See discussion infra Part IV.B.1-2.
155 Managers Charged over Fatal Crossair Crash, SWISSINFO.CH (Oct. 26, 2007),
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/Managers-charged-over fatalCrossair-crash.
html?cid=6215422 [hereinafter Managers Charged]; Elizabeth Olson, Crash Deals
New Blow to Revival of Swiss Airline, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at W1, available at
2001 WLNR 3378704. Crossair eventually became Swiss International Airlines,
which was then acquired by the German company, Lufthansa. Culture of Fear
Blamed for Zurich Air Crash, SWISSINFO.CH (Apr. 28, 2008), http://www.swissinfo.
ch/eng/news-digest/index/Culture of fear blamedfor_Zurich air_crash.html
?cid=6617240.
156 Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau of Switzerland, Final Report No. 1793
Concerning the Accident to the Aircraft A VRO 146-RJ100, HB-1XM, Operated by Crossair
Under Flight Number CRX 3597 on 24 November 2001 near Bassersdorf/2H, at 11-12,
Doc. HB-1XM (CRX 3597) (2001).
157 Id. at 12-13. Other factors cited as contributing to the crash were the lack
of a minimum safety altitude warning (MSAW), an overworked and fatigued pi-
lot, inappropriate task-sharing between the flight crew during the approach (with
the captain failing to cede responsibility for observation of outside visual refer-
ence points to his co-pilot in order to closely monitor his instruments and the
aircraft's altitude), the absence of any marking designating the range of hills on
the approach chart used by the flight crew, and the inappropriate decision to use
a VOR/DME approach on the particular runway given the valid visual mini-
mums. Id.
1S Id. at 12.
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1. Independent Safety Investigation
The final accident report released by the Swiss aircraft acci-
dent investigators159 concluded that the pilot of Crossair Flight
3597 was "overtired," overworked, and "flying too low" as he at-
tempted to negotiate the landing in poor weather conditions
after dark. 6 ° The report also identified a history of safety infrac-
tions by the commanding pilot (which were not acted upon by
Crossair management), as well as a compromised safety culture
and "poor pilot training" at the airline.1 61
2. Involvement of Criminal Authorities
Following the report's release in 2004, Swiss federal prosecu-
tors initiated a criminal inquiry that focused solely on individu-
als; Mr. Andr6 Dose, the chief executive of Crossair at the time
of the accident, was placed under investigation in connection
with the 2001 crash. 162 Amidst speculation that he could face
legal action for negligent homicide and other charges, Mr. Dos6
resigned from his then-current position as chief of Swiss Interna-
tional Airlines (or "Swiss," which had been formed out of Cros-
sair).163 Mr. Dose's resignation, combined with the criminal
investigation, put the airline on even shakier ground.164
The Swiss Federal Prosecutor's Office also targeted the head
of Switzerland's Federal Office for Civil Aviation, who resigned
"after a report by a Dutch aviation institute [instructed] the
Swiss to improve air safety following a series of aviation acci-
dents," as well as the operations chief and chief pilot trainer at
Crossair1 65
159 In the Swiss Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) Report's "Gen-
eral remarks," it notes that "the sole objective of the investigation of an accident
or incident shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents. It is not the pur-
pose of this activity to apportion blame or liability." Id. at 2. Moreover,
"[a] ccording to art. 24 of the Swiss Air Navigation Law the legal assessment of
accident/incident causes and circumstances is no concern of the investigation."
Id.
160 Fiona Fleck, Swiss open Formal Inquiry into Ex-Crossair Executives, INT'L HER-
ALD TRIB., Mar. 13, 2004, at 13, available at 2004 WLNR 5225685. The Bureau
noted that the pilot was in violation of "Swiss legal limits on maximum flying time
for two days [prior to] the crash," and had been working for more than 13 hours
at the time of the accident. Id.
161 Id.; Managers Charged, supra note 155.
162 Fleck, supra note 160.
163 Id.
164 Fiona Fleck, International Business; Ex-Airline Chief Scrutinized for Any Link to
Swiss Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2004, at C4, available at 2004 WLNR 5540059.
165 Fleck, supra note 160.
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Three years later, in October 2007, after the victims' families
had already been financially compensated, the Federal Prosecu-
tor's Office announced that six managers had been charged
with "negligent homicide and grievous bodily harm" by negli-
gence in connection with the 2001 Crossair crash. 166 These of-
fenses, which "carry a maximum three-year prison sentence or a
fine,"'1 67 were based on the prosecutor's conclusion that the
Crossair pilot was "unfit to fly as a captain."' 16 Further, the pros-
ecutor alleged that Crossair founder, Moritz Suter, and his suc-
cessor, Dose, "maintained a 'culture of fear' among their pilots,"
preventing them from reporting incidents and instructing them
to compromise safety rules in an effort to keep airline costs
down. 169 To convict, the prosecutor had to "prove that decisions
made by [the charged] executives directly contributed to the
crash."17
On May 16, 2008, nearly seven years after the crash, a Swiss
federal court acquitted the ex-Crossair employees of all
charges.' 71
As exemplified by the crashes discussed herein, criminal pros-
ecutions in the aviation sphere tend to do more harm than
good. Criminal investigations and prosecutions are often pro-
tracted events that persist for many years after an accident oc-
curs. By the time a trial takes place, the technical investigation
may be long concluded, victims' families have often been com-
pensated years before, and safety recommendations derived
from the circumstances of the crash have already been issued
and implemented.
The criminal trial arising out of the 1992 Air Inter crash did
not begin until fourteen years after that accident-well after rec-
166 Managers Charged, supra note 155.
167 Id.
168 Thomas Stocker, Crossair Executives Indicted for Homicide by Neglect, AVIATION
INT'L NEWS (Mar. 1, 2008), http://www.ainonline.com/news/single-news-page/
article/crossair-executives-indicted-for-homicide-by-neglect-13575/.
169 Thomas Stocker, Prosecution Names Suter, Dos in Indictments, AVIATION INT'L
NEWS (Apr. 28, 2008), http://www.ainonline.com/news/single-news-page/
article/prosecution-names-suter-dose-in-indictments-14318/; see also Thomas
Stocker, Crossair Execs Found Not Guilty in Homicide Trial, AVIATION INT'L NEWS
(June 1, 2008), http://www.ainonline.com/news/singlenews-page/article/cros-
sair-execs-found-not-guilty-in-homicide-trial-16143/ [hereinafter Crossair Execs
Found Not Guilty].
170 Crossair Bosses Face Damaging Allegations, SWISSINFO.CH (May 5, 2008), http://
www.swissinfo.ch/eng/Home/Archive/Crossair-bossesface-damaging-allega-
tions.html?cid=6632010.
171 Crossair Execs Found Not Guilty, supra note 169.
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ommended safety modifications were made to the Airbus
autopilot onboard. 172 The Air France Concorde crash case fi-
nally went to trial a decade later-years after the victims' fami-
lies were compensated and the aircraft at issue was permanently
retired from service."7 3 In the meantime, those under investiga-
tion or indictment must live with the stress of the looming
threat of prosecution, while the inefficient prosecutorial process
hemorrhages time and resources. 74
By contrast, the agencies responsible for conducting the safety
investigations operate according to a more reasonable timeline;
ICAO Annex 13 states that "[i] n the interest of accident preven-
tion, the State conducting the investigation of an accident or
incident shall release the Final Report as soon as possible," rec-
ommending its completion "within twelve months of the date of
occurrence."'175 In the event the report cannot be finalized
within that time, the state should release interim reports "on
each anniversary of the occurrence, detailing the progress of the
investigation and any safety issues raised."' 76 Similarly, NTSB ac-
cident reports typically issue within twelve and eighteen months
after an accident, 177 and EU Directive 94/56/EC calls for a re-
port "to be issued in the shortest possible time and if possible
within 12 months."'7 8
Moreover, the inevitable conflicts that emerge from different
investigating agencies competing for access to the same evi-
dence can lead to substantial delays in the safety investigation,
not to mention the risk of collecting incomplete information as
a result of interviewees' reticence in the face of possible
prosecution. 1 7 9
The risk of a criminal conviction may also have direct conse-
quences in the civil context-an insurance carrier's exposure to
172 See supra Part III.D.3.a.
173 See supra Part III.D.4.a.
174 "'It's certainly an ominous development for global aviation and insurers to
face the prospects of criminal liability even after they've long settled the civil
cases .... The costs of a 10-year investigation and four-month trial can be stag-
gering."' Zack Phillips, Airline Faces Criminal Trial over Fatal Concorde Crash, Bus.
INS., Feb. 8, 2010, at 4, available at http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/
20100207/ISSUEO1/302079975 (quoting Kenneth P. Quinn).
175 Annex 13, supra note 2, § 6.5.
176 Id. § 6.6
177 Dempsey, supra note 37, at 271-72.
178 EC Staff Working Document, supra note 26, at 11-12, tbl.1.
179 See id. § 3.3.1.1.
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larger settlement figures may rise or the airline may face puni-
tive damages.'8 0
Even in countries where criminal investigations and prosecu-
tions are more common, convictions are rare; and even when
handed down, they routinely get reversed on appeal.' This
prompts serious skepticism about the long-term value of pro-
tracted, expensive criminal investigations that may interfere with
critical safety analyses in their wake.
V. THE JOINT RESOLUTION REGARDING
CRIMINALIZATION OF AVIATION ACCIDENTS
AND ITS EFFECTS
Against this background of increasing criminal prosecutions,
in an attempt to protect the free flow of critical safety informa-
tion, an unprecedented Joint Resolution Regarding Criminaliza-
tion of Aviation Accidents (Joint Resolution) was issued in Fall
2006 and originally approved by the Flight Safety Foundation
(FSF), the Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS), the Academie Na-
tionale de l'Air et de l'Espace (ANAE), and the Civil Air Naviga-
tion Services Organisation (CANSO).1 2 Other agencies, such as
the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associa-
tions, joined soon thereafter, and in 2010, the International So-
ciety of Aviation Safety Investigators (ISASI) signed on.ls3
The Joint Resolution recognizes "the importance in civil avia-
tion accident investigations in securing the free flow of informa-
tion to determine the cause of accidents and incidents and to
prevent future accidents and incidents.' 18 4 It acknowledges that
the "predominant risk of criminalization .. .is the refusal of
witnesses to cooperate with investigations, as individuals ...
[may] choose not to freely admit mistakes."'8 5 As the "vast ma-
jority of aviation accidents result from inadvertent, and often
multiple, human errors," and "being convinced that criminal in-
vestigations and prosecutions in the wake of aviation accidents
180 Phillips, supra note 174.
181 See, e.g., discussion supra Parts III.D.3., JV.B.2.
182 Joint Resolution Regarding Criminalization of Aviation Accidents, 1, 4 (Oct. 17,
2006) [hereinafter Joint Resolution], available at flightsafety.org/files/resolu-
tion_01-12-10.pdf.
183 Id. at 5; Ramon Lopez, Accident Investigators Sign Criminalization Resolution,
AIR SAFETY WEEK (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.aviationtoday.com/asw/topstories/
Accident-Investigators-Sign-Criminalization-Resolution_65883.html.
184 Joint Resolution, supra note 182, at 1.
185 Id. at 2.
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can interfere with the efficient and effective investigation of ac-
cidents and prevent the timely and accurate determination of
probable cause and issuance of recommendations to prevent re-
currence," the document essentially proposes five "resolutions":
(1) "that the paramount consideration" in a post-accident inves-
tigation is the determination of probable cause, not the pun-
ishment of the key players;
(2) that absent clear evidence of criminal intent, criminalization
of aviation disasters is not an effective deterrent or in the
best interests of public safety;
(3) that States "exercise far greater restraint" before initiating
criminal investigations, as the aviation system and disaster
victims are better served by "strong regulatory oversight" and
the pursuit of civil claims to obtain compensation;
(4) that States "safeguard the safety investigation report and
probable cause/contributing factor conclusions from prema-
ture disclosure" or use in civil or criminal proceedings, as
technical and legal causes should not be equated; and
(5) that national aviation and accident investigating authorities
exert control over investigations to keep them "free from un-
due interference from law enforcement" so they may serve as
effective vehicles in uncovering critical safety information
and making improvements for the industry's future.
1 8 6
While this Joint Resolution may be viewed as merely a policy
statement with no "teeth," following its passage, it appeared that
prosecutors responded, in part, by being less likely to indict
''people on the line," and instead shifted their focus to upper
management and corporate executives "accountable for failed
systems" following an aviation disaster. 187 Indeed, in acquitting
the individuals charged in the Air Inter case, the French court
cited the newly issued Joint Resolution in its verdict, which ex-
acted damages only on the aircraft manufacturer and airline.1"'
This recognition that the individual pilot, co-pilot, or mechanic
"on the ground" typically lacks the requisite criminal intent to
justify prosecution prompts criminal authorities to target the de-
cision-makers, or the corporate entity (such as the airline) as a
whole, for faulty safety policies or their enforcement. 189 "A cor-
poration may be held vicariously liable... for the unlawful con-
duct of its employees, provided that such conduct is within the
186 Id. at 2-3.
18 Werfelman, supra note 3, at 16 (quoting Flight Safety Foundation President,
William Voss).
188 Quinn, supra note 1.
189 Id. at 11-13.
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scope of the employee's authority and performed for the benefit
of the corporation"-"even if the employee's actions are against
explicit corporate policy."19 Similarly, the "collective knowl-
edge doctrine" provides that a corporation is imbued with "the
totality" of the knowledge possessed by its employees. 191 This
doctrine, while insufficient to establish specific criminal intent,
has been utilized by state and federal prosecutors alike to at-
tempt to establish such intent against a corporation for actions
that led to a fatal airline crash. 19 2
Problematically, while the pilots may lack intent, the targeted
corporate executives typically "lack[ ] the particularized knowl-
edge, skill, [and] training. . . of those who are most likely to be
the true agents of wrongdoing" within the company. 9 ' Effec-
tively, executives are prosecuted for their subordinates' failure
to adhere to "the standard[ ] of care imposed upon them indi-
vidually by the FARs. 19 4 Therefore, in their attempt to avoid
targeting those individuals who clearly lacked the intent to com-
mit a crime (e.g. the pilot, flightcrew, and those who have rou-
tine contact with and maintenance responsibilities for the
aircraft), prosecutors may seek to punish those with an even
more tenuous connection to the accident's occurrence or the
failures that contributed to it.
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
Given the troubling consequences of the current environ-
ment of increased criminal prosecutions following an air crash,
it behooves the aviation industry to consider potential initiatives
to restore and protect the primary objective of fostering aviation
safety. A few compelling proposals follow.
190 NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 915 (citing various cases).
191 Id. at 919 (citing United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st
Cir. 1987)).
192 Id. at 919-20 (referring to the SabreTech prosecution, in which federal au-
thorities sought to broaden the scope of what could be considered to prove cor-
porate intent to include not only employee knowledge, but "information
contained in corporate files and manuals," regardless of the employees' aware-
ness of the same).
193 Id. at 916.
194 Id. at 917.
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A. ESTABLISHMENT OF A GLOBAL STANDARD FOR CRIMINAL
LIABILITY IN THE AvIATION CONTEXT
1. A Lack of Intent = A Lack of Deterrence: The Unintended Effects
of Criminalizing Unintentional Harm
Perhaps most concerning about the interjection of criminal
law enforcement into the post-air-disaster realm is the conse-
quence that pilots or other aviation professionals are being pros-
ecuted for acts of mere negligence, without criminal intent.195
A clearly defined international standard of what qualifies as will-
ful misconduct for the purpose of imposing criminal sanctions
in the context of aviation disasters is warranted. There should
be global recognition and enforcement of the principle that, in
the absence of the adequate mens rea, above and beyond mere
negligence, criminal investigations and prosecutions are not
appropriate.
As one source aptly stated:
Unless there is evidence of an intentional wrong, there can be
little justification for criminal prosecution. Often, an accident
has been caused by simple, ordinary negligence. Criminalization
of aviation accidents may actually be detrimental to safety. Ab-
sent intentional harm, we must retreat from the notion that ven-
geance must be exacted whenever human lives are lost.' 96
Deterrence of future aviation disasters is better served by the
existing administrative and civil remedies than by the threat of
criminal prosecution; "[c] riminal sanctions are ineffective to de-
ter behavior that is neither intended nor foreseen."' 97 Indeed,
"[a] pproximately seventy-five [percent] of aircraft accidents in
the United States involve some form of human error.' 9 8 When
a crash is the result of mere mistake, one of the predominant
goals of exacting criminal punishment-deterrence-is lost.'99
The drawbacks of increased criminal prosecutions-namely, ex-
pense, interference with safety investigations, and potentially
devastating consequences to aviation professionals and corpora-
tions alike-therefore become even more concerning in the
face of their minimal benefit.
195 See, e.g., United States v. SabreTech, Inc., 271 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2001).
196 Dempsey, supra note 37, at 282-83.
197 NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 920.
198 Id. at 904; Quinn, supra note 1, at 11 (stating that "[m]ost accidents are the
result of human errors").
199 See Quinn, supra note 1, at 11-12.
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In a 2007 presentation at an ICAO regional seminar, Captain
Paul McCarthy, the International Federation of Air Line Pilots'
Associations' (IFALPA) representative to ICAO, artfully charac-
terized this as "'the fundamental principle that punishment
does not improve safety' because the threat of punishment-
which may deter intentional acts-has no effect on unintentional
errors that lead to accidents. 20'  The Joint Resolution recog-
nizes the same principle: "Increasing safety in the aviation indus-
try is a greater benefit to society than seeking criminal
punishment for those 'guilty' of human error or tragic
mistakes. 20
Courts in the United States have been less willing than else-
where to prosecute without the requisite criminal intent. In
State v. Chapman,2 °2 for example, the court held that an involun-
tary manslaughter conviction "requires a showing of gross negli-
gence [exemplified by] conduct that amounts to wanton or
reckless disregard for human life"-not mere negligence.0 3
There, a military pilot was on trial for the deaths of three Mary-
land residents caused by his unoccupied B-25 bomber crashing
into a home.2 4 The evidence revealed that, after extensive con-
sultation with military authorities on the ground, his fellow pi-
lots, and maintenance personnel, the decision was made to
abandon the aircraft.20 5 The court held the pilot's conduct did
not amount to gross negligence and noted that "[i]f the resul-
tant deaths were merely accidental or the result of a misadven-
ture or due to simple negligence, or an honest error of
judgment in performing a lawful act, the existence of gross neg-
ligence should not be found. '2 6 Likewise, in reversing the reck-
200 Werfelman, supra note 3, at 16-17 (emphasis added). Likewise, the Inter-
national Federation of Air Traffic Controllers (IFATCA) said that "'experience
has shown that criminal prosecution makes no contribution to improving system
safety.'" Id. at 17.
201 Joint Resolution, supra note 182, at 3; see also Quinn, supra note 1, at 11 (not-
ing the recent trend among prosecutors and judges worldwide to turn "the pow-
erful weapons of criminal prosecution against what are simply tragic accidents,
the result of mistakes, not willful actions").
202 State v. Chapman, 101 F. Supp. 335 (D. Md. 1951).
203 NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 921-22 (citing Chapman, 101 F. Supp. at
341).
204 Chapman, 101 F. Supp. at 336-37.
205 Id. at 338-39.
206 Id. at 341. "Negligence" is the failure to "exercise reasonable care under all
the circumstances." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1 2005). Conversely, "reckless conduct," or "willful or wanton misconduct,"
occurs when one knows or should know of the "risk of harm created by the con-
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lessness convictions against SabreTech, the Eleventh Circuit
acknowledged that while "these aviation repair station person-
nel committed mistakes, . . . they did not commit crimes," and
"did not intend to kill" the accident victims.
20 7
ICAO standards, too, reinforce that discipline or punishment
of those involved in an aviation accident is only appropriate
where evidence shows the event "was caused by an act consid-
ered, in accordance with the law, to be conduct with intent to
cause damage, or conduct with knowledge that damage would
probably result, equivalent to reckless conduct, gross negligence or
wilful misconduct. '208 At present, however, this reluctance to
charge and convict for mere negligence is troublingly not
universal.
2. Criminalization of Merely Negligent Acts Would Not Benefit
Defendants in Civil Negligence Actions
Interestingly, the unintended negative consequences of
criminalization discussed above would not be counter-balanced
by the unintended benefits to civil defendants. That is, poten-
tial defendants would still be exposed to liability in civil negli-
gence actions arising from aviation disasters, even if other actors
were criminally prosecuted for causing the same harm.
In the tort law context, defendants accused of negligence
could, in past years, escape liability by showing that some other
action was an intervening, "superseding cause" of the harm.2 0 9
duct" and "fail[s] to adopt [a] precaution" against such harm. Id. § 2. "Willful"
in the criminal context "is a word of many meanings"-it can mean that the actor
"intended to violate the law or to injure another," or it can "include an element
of knowledge on the actor's part that his ... conduct is harmful and ... unlaw-
ful." 21 Am. JUR. 2D Criminal Law §130 (2011). Of note, a Working Paper
presented by Australia at the 37th ICAO Assembly Session acknowledges the com-
plications inherent in importing "decidedly legal concepts" such as "willful," "de-
liberate," "recklessness," and "gross negligence" into a discussion of 'just culture"
and resolutions aimed to distance the world of aviation safety from the judicial
realm. Some Caveats on 'Just Culture" 5 (Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Working Paper
No. A37-WP/289, TE/149, (2010)).
207 United States v. SabreTech, Inc., 271 F.3d 1018, 1019, 1025 (11th Cir.
2001).
208 ICAO, Amendment 11 to the International Standards and Recommended Practices,
Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, Annex 13, Attachment E, at 3-4 (2006)
[hereinafter Attachment A] (emphasis added) (providing that safety information
should be protected from disclosure to, or use by, disciplinary or criminal author-
ities unless there is evidence that an occurrence was caused by conduct involving
this level of intent).
209 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965).
4432011]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
An intervening, superseding act was one that was both unfore-
seeable and intentional.2 '° But tort law treatises also set forth the
rule that intervening criminal acts cut off negligence liability as
a matter of law.2 1' It is clear that the assumption underlying this
rule was that all criminal acts are intentional, or at least commit-
ted with a culpable state of mind. Thus, for example, the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts offers the example of a railroad that
"negligently derails a tank car full of gasoline and damages it,"
causing the gasoline to run into the public street; the railroad's
liability for negligence is cut off when another party "deliber-
ately sets fire to the gasoline. 212 Under this former regime, de-
fendants in civil negligence actions arising from aviation
disasters may have been able to advance a tenable argument that
they should not be held liable in negligence if someone else had
already been criminally charged with causing the disaster.
Over the past few decades, however, this rigid two-prong doc-
trine has been abandoned in favor of a foreseeability analysis
under which a negligent defendant is held liable for all harm
created by the risks of its negligent acts. 213 Courts favor this
more flexible approach, recognizing that "the criminality of
[an] act does not, by that fact alone, render such act unforesee-
able. '214 In one case, an aircraft passenger died when his plane
collided with power lines spanning a canyon; the passenger's
wife sued the power company for negligence, alleging that it
failed to mark the power lines or otherwise warn of their pres-
ence. 21 5 In its defense, the power company argued that any neg-
ligence on its part was superseded by the fact that the pilot had
been flying too low in the vicinity of a town, in violation of FAA
regulations. 216 The appellate court disagreed, holding that the
criminal act of a third party does not sever a defendant's liability
for negligence if the criminal act is reasonably foreseeable.21 7 Be-
cause the power company could have foreseen that pilots would
fly in the vicinity of the canyon, it was liable for negligently fail-
210 Id. § 442B.
211 See id. § 442B, cmt. c; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 34 cmt. e
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
212 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442B cmt. c, illus. 6, 8 (1965).
213 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 34 cmt. e (Proposed Final Draft No. 1
2005).
214 See, e.g., Sewell v. Pub. Serv. Co., 832 P.2d 994, 999 (Colo. App. 1991).
215 Id. at 995.
216 Id. at 995-96.
217 Id. at 999 (citing Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989)).
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ing to mark the lines .2 1  As courts now adhere to this foresee-
ability analysis in negligence cases, defendants typically cannot
escape liability by the mere fact that another actor is criminally
charged in connection with an aviation disaster.219 Thus,
criminalization of merely negligent acts will not result in unin-
tentional benefits to defendants in civil negligence actions.
3. Regulatory Remedies and Investigations Render Criminal
Prosecution Unnecessary
In addition to serving no deterrent purpose, criminal prose-
cutions are not necessary to promote aviation safety in light of
the procedures already in place. In the United States, for exam-
ple, the threat of FAA legal enforcement has long been suffi-
cient to deter errant conduct by aviation professionals,
particularly in light of this agency's power over the certificates
that are pre-requisites for these professionals' continued em-
ployment-in addition to the potential for other penalties and
fines. 220
Moreover, the NTSB already employs an established proce-
dure for thoroughly investigating an accident's circumstances,
determining its probable causes, and generating safety recom-
mendations for the future.221 Supplemental criminal inquiries
are not necessary. 222 The respect and veneration for the effec-
tiveness of the NTSB in identifying the root causes of a crash
and ensuring they are not repeated is widespread. As one
source notes, "the U.S. Aviation industry has worked astonish-
ingly well in the past, without the help of criminal law enforce-
ment," attributing this success to the aviation community's
cooperation with the NTSB . 2 3 Another author acknowledged
218 Id. at 998-99. Commonplace infractions are not the only unlawful acts that
have been held to be foreseeable in negligence cases. In fact, and astonishingly,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held in 2003 that
the airlines involved in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks had a duty of
care to properly screen passengers, and that the acts of terrorism and subsequent
harm were within the class of foreseeable hazards resulting from negligently per-
formed security screenings. In re September 11 Litigation, 280 F. Supp. 2d 279,
293-94, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Although the September 11 litigation may have
been exceptional, it nonetheless evidences the potentially far-reaching effects of
the foreseeability doctrine.
219 See Sewell, 832 P.2d at 999.
220 NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 922-23.
221 About the NTSB: The Investigative Process, NAT'L TRANSP. SArEry BD., http://
www.ntsb.gov/abt-ntsb/invest.htm (last visited May 29, 2011).
222 Id.
223 Dunn, Colombo & Nold, supra note 55, at 17.
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the "enormous influence" exerted by the NTSB, "based on the
independence and accuracy of its accident investigations and
the authority of its recommendations. 22 4 Regardless of whether
criminal prosecutions ultimately result in convictions, their
threat alone has a deleterious effect. Protracted criminal investi-
gations in and of themselves inspire aviation professionals to re-
main tight-lipped, impeding the NTSB's indispensible safety-
oriented objectives.225
4. Self-Preservation, More Than Avoidance of Punishment, Serves
as an Incentive to Stay Safe
Finally, aviation professionals-particularly flightcrew-are
subject to the greatest incentive of all: their own self-preserva-
tion. There is little need to deter negligence among pilots and
their crew when unsafe conduct would likely result in their be-
coming the unwilling victims of their own negligence.226 Corpo-
rations, too-such as aircraft manufacturers and airlines-face
serious threats to their own "survival" from negative press follow-
ing an aviation disaster in an industry in which a tarnished repu-
tation could serve as a "death sentence. ' 227 This prompts
corporations to increase their attention to safety measures for
business survival and success, if for nothing else.
5. Not Above the Law
Nevertheless, the aviation industry recognizes that criminal
prosecutions are appropriate whenever criminal activity is sus-
pected as a contributing cause of an aviation accident. For ex-
ample, where terrorism is clearly at an accident's root, such as in
the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon, the promotion of safety is best served by the crim-
inal law enforcement authorities immediately assuming control
of the scene and its investigation. 228 Evidence of clear criminal
intent also exists in cases of hijacking, piloting while intoxicated,
and aircraft theft.229 As former NTSB Chairman Jim Hall re-
marked, "[t]he Board's intent is not to prevent prosecutions,
but rather to prevent them from preempting or thwarting a
224 Dempsey, supra note 37, at 272.
225 See NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 911, 922.
226 Id. at 923.
227 See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 1.
228 NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 890.
229 Id. at 923.
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thorough safety investigation of a transportation tragedy. '230 In
the United States, Congress has reaffirmed that it is the NTSB
that has the authority to determine whether an accident's cause
"was truly accidental. '231 ICAO Annex 13 provides that if, in the
course of the investigation, it becomes known or "suspected...
that an act of unlawful interference was involved, the investiga-
tor-in-charge shall immediately initiate action to ensure that the
aviation security authorities of the [relevant] State (s) concerned
are so informed. ' 232 However, where evidence suggests that an
accident was caused by mere negligence-such as pilot error or
a mechanic's mistake-criminal investigation is not justified.233
In short, aviation safety would be well-served by the establish-
ment of an international standard defining the requisite crimi-
nal intent before prosecution is initiated.
B. VOLUNTARY REPORTING SYSTEMS
It is critical to establish non-punitive incident reporting sys-
tems to encourage the free flow of safety information without
consequence. This enables those most intimately involved with
the regular workings of the aviation industry to share safety-re-
lated concerns-before an accident results-without fear of
punishment.
ICAO Annex 13 requires that each state set up "a mandatory
incident reporting system to facilitate [the] collection of infor-
mation on actual or potential safety deficiencies. ' 23 4 In addi-
tion, ICAO recommends the establishment of a voluntary
incident reporting system that is "non-punitive and afford[s]
protection to the sources of the information. ' 23 5 The states
would analyze the information gathered through their reporting
systems "to determine any preventative actions required.
236
ICAO further recommends that states promote safety informa-
tion sharing networks to facilitate the free exchange of safety
information.23 v
230 Hall Remarks, supra note 42.
231 NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 884.
232 Annex 13, supra note 2, at 5-3.
23 NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 884.
234 Annex 13, supra note 2, at 8-1.
235 Id. ICAO goes on to note that "[a] non-punitive environment is fundamen-
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In 2006, Attachment E to Annex 13 was adopted to provide
legal guidance for the protection of safety data gathered during
investigations.3 s Attachment E provides "[p] rinciples of protec-
tion" for information that was collected explicitly for safety pur-
poses, the disclosure of which would "inhibit its continued
availability. ' 239 The use of such safety information in judicial
"proceedings should be carried out only under suitable safe-
guards provided by national law." 240 Nevertheless, Attachment E
also sets forth "[p]rinciples of exception" to the protections
granted to safety information where evidence exists that an oc-
currence was caused "with intent to cause damage, or conduct
with knowledge that damage would probably result, equivalent
to reckless conduct, gross negligence or [willful] miscon-
duct. ' 241 Moreover, safety information may be disclosed when
an "appropriate authority" decides that its release is "necessary
for the proper administration ofjustice" and "outweighs the ad-
verse domestic and international impact such release may have
on the future availability of safety information. 242
These principles, while intended to assist ICAO member
states in striking a balance between protection of safety informa-
tion on the one hand, and disclosure where warranted for the
"proper administration of justice" on the other, are simply "gui-
dance"-not requirements. 24 3
1. The United States
Domestically, the FAA enacted the Aviation Safety Reporting
Program (ASRP), set forth in FAR § 91.25, which provides lim-
ited immunity from FAA sanctions to those pilots, flight attend-
ants, maintenance personnel and other aviation professionals
who file a report within ten days of an incident or occurrence to
help prevent future incidents.244 In fact, to encourage the re-
porting of "actual or potential discrepancies and deficiencies"
involving aviation safety, the FAA designated NASA as a third
238 See Attachment E, supra note 208, at 1.
239 Id. at 2.
240 Id. at 3.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 1-2.
244 NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 912 (citing FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AC No.
00-46D, FAA AVLATION SAFETY REPORTING PROGRAM (1997) [hereinafter AC 00-
46D]).
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party to receive and process the submitted reports.2 45 This en-
sures the anonymity of the reporter and any involved parties,
further insulating them from FAA regulatory authorities so as to
increase the system's effectiveness. 246 Because the filing of such
reports is considered "indicative of a constructive attitude," the
FAA will not use the reports or information obtained therefrom
in any disciplinary action, nor will it impose a civil penalty or
certificate of suspension if a violation is found.247 However, this
protection does not extend to "criminal activit[ies], aircraft acci-
dents, lack of qualifications or competence, intentional actions,
or to prior violations by an individual within the previous five
years. 24
8
More recently, the FAA implemented two additional report-
ing systems.249 First, under the Flight-Operations Quality Assur-
ance (FOQA), participating airline operators regularly cull and
submit data retrieved from onboard recorders to the FAA so
that it may monitor trends and identify risk areas in aircraft op-
erations.2 5 0 This data is analyzed to detect technical flaws or un-
safe conditions-in areas such as maintenance, engineering,
ATC procedures, and airport surface issues-before they result
in aircraft accidents. 251 Data submitted through this program is
protected from use in an enforcement action against the submit-
ting operator, unless it relates to a criminal or deliberate act,
results from willful misconduct or a willful violation, or the oper-
ator is not complying with the program.252
Second, the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) allows
"certain employees of participating air carriers and major repair
stations [to] voluntarily report safety issues and events. '253 The
report is generally protected from use in any FAA enforcement
action, but here, too, the reported information must not appear
to involve criminal activity. 2
54
245 AC 00-46D, supra note 244, § 1.
246 Id. § 3. Where applicable, NASA will "de-identify" all information that
might assist in the identification of those filing the ASRS reports within 72 hours
of their receipt. Id. § 8.
247 Id. § 9.
248 NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 912-13; AC 00-46D, supra note 244, § 9.
249 NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 913.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id. at 914-15.
253 Id. at 913.
254 Id. at 913-14.
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These programs are designed so that "pilots, maintenance
techs, controllers, [and] even passengers, can [anonymously]
submit reports of mistakes or incidents in which safety was com-
promised without fear of retribution from their employers, avia-
tion regulators or the courts. '255 Congress sought to strengthen
the protection afforded to those reporting under these systems;
this prompted the FAA to issue FAR Part 193 in 2001, which
provides for the non-disclosure of the information reported.256
However, Part 193 includes "significant exceptions"-for exam-
ple, it does not apply to information provided in the course of a
criminal investigation or prosecution and does not protect infor-
mation from 'use in enforcement proceedings. 257 Legislative ef-
forts for more comprehensive immunity for aviation safety
reporting are ongoing.258
2. Internationally
Similar reporting systems to those described above have been
established abroad as well. 259 The FOQA program was actually
modeled after one in place at British Airways decades earlier.260
Recently, the European Civil Aviation Conference and Joint Avi-
ation Authority jointly initiated the ECAC/JAA Aviation Safety
Action Program.26'
In addition, the Commission of the European Communities
issued a Staff Working Document that highlights the need for a
non-punitive reporting system.262 It characterizes open report-
ing and careful analysis of even the smallest incidents, failures,
and other occurrences in daily operations as "the crucial ele-
ment in prevention of accidents" and hails "occurrence report-
ing" as "an essential tool in promotion" of a 'Just Culture. 263
Indeed, EU Directive 2003/42/EC significantly contributed to
the establishment of a 'Just Culture" within the European civil
255 Esler, supra note 72.
256 NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 914.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 914-15.
259 Singer, supra note 76, at 500.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 See generally EC Staff Working Document, supra note 26.
263 Id. § 2.2.2 (defining "occurrence reporting" as "sophisticated systems which
call aviation professionals to report, in a protected environment, errors, abnor-
mal events and other irregular circumstances, and which allow to analyse the data
collected in order to draw and disseminate safety lessons and identify safety
risks").
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aviation community by obliging member states to ensure confi-
dentiality of the information reported by aviation profession-
als-and the identity of the reporter-as well as encouraging
states to promote the establishment of voluntary occurrence re-
porting systems. 264 The Directive went further to establish a cen-
tral repository of information on civil aviation occurrences
exchanged in accordance with it to better facilitate the dissemi-
nation of critical safety information.265
a. 'Just Culture"
The concept of 'Just Culture," promoted by the ICAO and the
European Community, underscores the international commit-
ment to an open, non-punitive incident reporting environment.
In its working paper prepared for presentation at the 2008 Acci-
dent Investigation and Prevention Group (AIG) meeting, ICAO
defined "Just Culture" as a working environment where
"frontline operators or others are not punished for actions,
omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate
with their experience and training, but where gross negligence,
[willful] violations and destructive acts are not tolerated. ' 266 In
other words, individuals who report mistakes are not blamed for
honest errors that do not rise to the level of willful misconduct;
as such, they will be more willing to proactively communicate
their own errors or other safety concerns, thereby increasing the
likelihood that more serious accidents will be avoided. The pa-
per sets forth evidence that the criminal prosecution of those
who filed voluntary reports has caused the collapse of reporting
systems, "creating a cover-up culture," and asks AIG to adopt a
just culture description within Annex 13.267 The ICAO proposal
urges states to adopt and implement just culture principles
within their own legal systems.268
All of these incident reporting efforts aim to facilitate the
early detection of potential safety issues in order to avert future
disasters. As Flight Safety Foundation President and CEO, Wil-
264 Id. § 2.3.2.
265 Id.
266 Id. § 2.2.2; David Learmount, ICAO Wants to Make Just Culture' Safety Report-
ing and Investigation Global, FLIGHT GLOBAL (Jan. 8, 2008), http://www.flight-
global.com/articies/2008/O8/O1/226289/icao-wants-to-make-just-culture-safety-
reporting-and-investigation.html [hereinafter ICAO Wants to Make just Culture'
Global].
267 ICAO Wants to Make just Culture' Global, supra note 266.
268 Id.
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liam R. Voss, commented: "'The safety of the traveling public
depends on encouraging a climate of openness and cooperation
following accidents .... Overzealous prosecutions threaten to
dry up vital sources of information and jeopardize safety."' 269 If
we are to encourage proactive, open communication about
safety concerns, we must prioritize the availability, function, and
protections granted by voluntary reporting systems throughout
the international aviation community.
C. INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF LIMITED IMMUNITY
U.S. courts are reluctant to extend Fifth Amendment protec-
tions in the civil aviation setting, absent a "substantial and real
possibility of future criminal prosecution. '' 27 ° However, this fails
to recognize that an individual's testimony itself may provide the
foundation for his subsequent criminal prosecution-particu-
larly in light of the FAA's obligation to inform the DOJ of any
potential criminal violations, and the DOJ's ability to utilize the
information gathered during the FAA investigation in its subse-
quent prosecution of airmen.271
To combat the likely chilling effect of this ever-present
prosecutorial threat, some form of limited-use immunity should
be applied to evidence and witness testimony provided during
the safety investigation phase. As the NTSB recommends,
" [i] mmunity from prosecution should be available to every wit-
ness called upon by the NTSB or the FAA to provide factual
information deemed necessary to a determination of the causes-
in-fact of the accident. ' 272 Ironically, as noted by the NTSB,
prosecutors' willingness to immunize witnesses in order to be
privy to the truth of an accident's cause serves as an implicit
acknowledgment that "the pursuit of truth for purposes of pro-
moting aviation safety is really the paramount concern in these
investigations. "273
269 Werfelman, supra note 3, at 13.
270 NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 906 (citing Roach v. Nat'l Transp. Safety
Bd., 804 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (10th Cir. 1986)).
271 Id.
272 Id. at 927.
273 Id. at 910.
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D. ESTABLISHMENT OF A COORDINATED AGREEMENT AMONG
INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES
Finally, many in the aviation industry agree that the accident
and criminal investigative agencies need to establish a coordi-
nated agreement regarding the conduct and progress of post-
accident investigations. 274 For example, former NTSB Chair-
man Hall suggests that such an "agreement must address when a
criminal investigation should be initiated" in relation to the
safety investigation, as well as "how safety investigations will be
conducted to ensure that evidence and information are prop-
erly protected. ' 275 The NTSB concurred with recommendations
made to the House of Representatives Aviation Subcommittee
urging the NTSB, FAA, and DOJ to 'jointly develop a policy that
provides specific guidance to prosecutors as to when it is appro-
priate to institute a criminal investigation of a transportation
accident. 276
Indeed, ICAO Annex 13 instructs "[t]he State conducting the
safety investigation [to] recognize the need for coordination be-
tween the investigator-in-charge and the judicial authorities,"
particularly in the gathering of critical evidence, such as flight
recorder read-outs and victim examinations.277 The Commis-
sion of the European Communities recognized the challenge
facing various agencies involved in post-accident investigation to
both cooperate-particularly with regard to their mutual need
for gathering evidence-while retaining the independence to
carry out their divergent purposes. 27
By way of example, the Commission cited the multiple investi-
gations that followed the Air France Concorde crash as illustra-
tive of the practical difficulties in achieving this coordination.279
There, three inquiry teams were vying for access to the same
physical evidence-the BEA technical investigative team, the
prosecutors, and a panel of experts convened by the French
274 See, e.g., Annex 13, supra note 2, at 5-2; Hall Remarks, supra note 42; NTSB
Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 927-28.
275 Hall Remarks, supra note 42.
276 NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 927-28 (elaborating "that criminal prose-
cution should be selective and undertaken only when it will enhance the safety or
security of the flying public and when it will not impede investigations by the
NTSB or the FAA into the causes of the accident").
277 Annex 13, supra note 2, at 5-2.
278 EC Staff Working Document, supra note 26, § 3.3.1.1.
279 Id.
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transport minister.2 ° This resulted in delays and restrictions in
the safety experts' access to the crash site and critical evi-
dence.28' The Commission noted that this is often the case
where judicial authorities claim their investigative efforts take
precedence over the technical inquiries, despite the broad prin-
ciples set forth in Directive 94/56/EC-intended to define the
rights of the safety investigators to the crash site and other rele-
vant evidence. 2  Similar challenges confronted the safety inves-
tigators seeking access to the wreckage following the Linate
Airport disaster 283 and the U.S. team involved in the Valujet in-
vestigation.284 Moreover, criminal authorities who inject them-
selves into an accident investigation at an early stage may do
injustice to the inquiry as a whole, as they often lack the techni-
cal and industry expertise otherwise possessed by the safety
investigators.285
These practical challenges are not mere administrative incon-
veniences-they may have serious safety consequences, includ-
ing incomplete findings, delayed issuance of the final report,
and inadequate safety recommendations. Nevertheless, even if
the safety investigation were allowed to proceed first, as the
NTSB suggested,286 the threat of subsequent criminal investiga-
tion and prosecution could still hamper information-gathering
efforts. As one source cautions, once statements and documen-
tary materials have been disclosed by the relevant witnesses, they
may be used by prosecutors to support a subsequent criminal
prosecution. 2 7 This creates a troubling dilemma: either coun-
sel will intervene early and aggressively to limit the information
communicated to the safety investigators, or witnesses who
speak freely may later find themselves, or their employers, sub-
ject to criminal charges. As another author articulates, aviation
professionals find themselves "having to choose between not in-
criminating themselves and enhancing the safety of aviation. 28 8
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 Id. § 3.3.1.1-1.2.
283 See discussion supra Part IV.A.3.
284 See discussion supra Part III.C.5.
285 See EC Staff Working Document, supra note 26, § 3.3-3.3.1.1.
286 Hall Remarks, supra note 42.
287 Dunn, Hazouri & Rannik, supra note 5, at 17, 25 (citing United States v.
Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970)) (information produced during civil discovery may
form the basis for a subsequent prosecution).
288 MICHAELIDES-MATEOU & MATEOU, supra note 3, at 4.
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As discussed above, a more robust limited-use immunity would
serve to address these concerns. a9
Allowing the technical investigation priority also could nega-
tively impact the interests of the judicial authorities involved:
the safety investigators may conduct destructive testing on criti-
cal evidence obtained from the crash site that cannot be re-
peated or may otherwise impact the authorities' access to
evidence needed to support their developing case.29 °
Although challenges abound, the aviation industry would ben-
efit greatly from a clear agreement setting forth a protocol for
the coordination of safety and judicial investigations.
VII. CONCLUSION
While victims' families may have a natural need to seek re-
venge and the general public may thirst for retribution, "prose-
cutors nonetheless should resist the urge to yield to the public
clamor, "291 and the global aviation industry must reinforce the
broader objective of increasing aviation safety to better prevent
future accidents.
Despite ICAO's established international framework prioritiz-
ing independent safety investigations, judicial authorities con-
tinue to inject themselves into the post-aviation accident arena.
While more common in certain countries abroad, such as
France, this trend has gained some traction domestically as well.
Considering the substantial, often decades-long, delay between
crash and conviction; the tendency for criminal sanctions (when
handed down at all) to be merely reversed on appeal; the weak,
if existent, deterrent value of criminal punishment for aviation
professionals; the detrimental effects of the threat of prosecu-
tion; and the competing interests of safety and criminal investi-
gators, it is not clear what goals are being served by this
increased judicial involvement.
While the aviation industry has taken steps to emphasize the
importance of protecting the free flow of safety information
amidst the growing threat of criminal prosecution through such
initiatives as the Joint Resolution and the establishment of vol-
untary incident reporting systems, the recent Air France Con-
corde verdict serves as a fresh reminder that the threat of
289 See discussion supra Part VI.C.
290 EC Staff Working Document, supra note 26, § 3.3.1.1-1.2.
291 NTSB Bar Ass'n, supra note 21, at 911-12.
20111
456 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [76
implementation of criminal sanctions in the aviation accident
context remains all too real.
An established international standard for what constitutes
criminal intent in the aviation sphere, the implementation of
non-punitive voluntary reporting systems, the increased availa-
bility of limited-use immunity to protect information provided
during the course of safety investigations, and a coordinated
agreement between technical and criminal investigation agen-
cies are among the initiatives that can move us toward ensuring
that aviation safety is prioritized over criminal retribution
around the world.
